The bigotry, the strong passions, the haughty and disdainful temper, which made Clarendon’s great abilities a source of almost unmixed evil to himself and to the public, had no place in the character of Temple.  To Temple, however, as well as to Clarendon, the rapid change which was taking place in the real working of the Constitution gave great disquiet; particularly as Temple had never sat in the English Parliament, and therefore regarded it with none of the predilection which men naturally feel for a body to which they belong, and for a theatre on which their own talents have been advantageously displayed.

To wrest by force from the House of Commons its newly acquired powers was impossible; nor was Temple a man to recommend such a stroke, even if it had been possible.  But was it possible that the House of Commons might be induced to let those powers drop?  Was it possible that, as a great revolution had been effected without any change in the outward form of the Government, so a great counter-revolution might be effected in the same manner?  Was it possible that the Crown and the Parliament might be placed in nearly the same relative position in which they had stood in the reign of Elizabeth, and that this might be done without one sword drawn, without one execution, and with the general acquiescence of the nation?

The English people—­it was probably thus that Temple argued—­will not bear to be governed by the unchecked power of the Sovereign, nor ought they to be so governed.  At present there is no check but the Parliament.  The limits which separate the power of checking those who govern from the power of governing are not easily to be defined.  The Parliament, therefore, supported by the nation, is rapidly drawing to itself all the powers of Government.  If it were possible to frame some other check on the power of the Crown, some check which might be less galling to the Sovereign than that by which he is now constantly tormented, and yet which might appear to the people to be a tolerable security against maladministration, Parliaments would probably meddle less; and they would be less supported by public opinion in their meddling.  That the King’s hands may not be rudely tied by others, he must consent to tie them lightly himself.  That the executive administration may not be usurped by the checking body, something of the character of a checking body must be given to the body which conducts the executive administration.  The Parliament is now arrogating to itself every day a larger share of the functions of the Privy Council.  We must stop the evil by giving to the Privy Council something of the constitution of a Parliament.  Let the nation see that all the King’s measures are directed by a Cabinet composed of representatives of every order in the State, by a Cabinet which contains, not placemen alone, but independent and popular noblemen and gentlemen who have large estates and no salaries, and who are not likely to sacrifice the public welfare