Prince, admonished by the fate of his father, never ventured to attack his Parliaments with open and arbitrary violence.  It was at one time by means of the Parliament itself, at another time by means of the courts of law, that he attempted to regain for the Crown its old predominance.  He began with great advantages.  The Parliament of 1661 was called while the nation was still full of joy and tenderness.  The great majority of the House of Commons were zealous royalists.  All the means of influence which the patronage of the Crown afforded were used without limit.  Bribery was reduced to a system.  The King, when he could spare money from his pleasures for nothing else, could spare it for purposes of corruption.  While the defence of the coasts was neglected, while ships rotted, while arsenals lay empty, while turbulent crowds of unpaid seamen swarmed in the streets of the seaports, something could still be scraped together in the Treasury for the members of the House of Commons.  The gold of France was largely employed for the same purpose.  Yet it was found, as indeed might have been foreseen, that there is a natural limit to the effect which can be produced by means like these.  There is one thing which the most corrupt senates are unwilling to sell; and that is the power which makes them worth buying.  The same selfish motives which induced them to take a price for a particular vote induce them to oppose every measure of which the effect would be to lower the importance, and consequently the price, of their votes.  About the income of their power, so to speak, they are quite ready to make bargains.  But they are not easily persuaded to part with any fragment of the principal.  It is curious to observe how, during the long continuance of this Parliament, the Pensionary Parliament, as it was nicknamed by contemporaries, though every circumstance seemed to be favourable to the Crown, the power of the Crown was constantly sinking, and that of the Commons constantly rising.  The meetings of the Houses were more frequent than in former reigns; their interference was more harassing to the Government than in former reigns; they had begun to make peace, to make war; to pull down, if they did not set up, administrations.  Already a new class of statesmen had appeared, unheard of before that time, but common ever since.  Under the Tudors and the earlier Stuarts, it was generally by courtly arts, or by official skill and knowledge, that a politician raised himself to power.  From the time of Charles the Second down to our own days a different species of talent, parliamentary talent, has been the most valuable of all the qualifications of an English statesman.  It has stood in the place of all other acquirements.  It has covered ignorance, weakness, rashness, the most fatal maladministration.  A great negotiator is nothing when compared with a great debater; and a Minister who can make a successful speech need trouble himself little about an unsuccessful