Sweden willingly acceded to the league, which is known in history by the name of the Triple Alliance; and, after some signs of ill-humour on the part of France, a general pacification was the result.

The Triple Alliance may be viewed in two lights; as a measure of foreign policy, and as a measure of domestic policy; and under both aspects it seems to us deserving of all the praise which has been bestowed upon it.

Dr. Lingard, who is undoubtedly a very able and well-informed writer, but whose great fundamental rule of judging seems to be that the popular opinion on a historical question cannot possibly be correct, speaks very slightingly of this celebrated treaty; and Mr. Courtenay, who by no means regards Temple with that profound veneration which is generally found in biographers, has conceded, in our opinion, far too much to Dr. Lingard.

The reasoning of Dr. Lingard is simply this.  The Triple Alliance only compelled Lewis to make peace on the terms on which, before the alliance was formed, he had offered to make peace.  How can it then be said that this alliance arrested his career, and preserved Europe from his ambition?  Now, this reasoning is evidently of no force at all, except on the supposition that Lewis would have held himself bound by his former offers, if the alliance had not been formed; and, if Dr. Lingard thinks this is a reasonable supposition, we should be disposed to say to him, in the words of that, great politician, Mrs. Western:  “Indeed, brother, you would make a fine plenipo to negotiate with the French.  They would soon persuade you that they take towns out of mere defensive principles.”  Our own impression is that Lewis made his offer only in order to avert some such measure as the Triple Alliance, and adhered to his offer only in consequence of that alliance.  He had refused to consent to an armistice.  He had made all his arrangements for a winter campaign.  In the very week in which Temple and the States concluded their agreement at the Hague, Franche Comte was attacked by the French armies, and in three weeks the whole province was conquered.  This prey Lewis was compelled to disgorge.  And what compelled him?  Did the object seem to him small or contemptible?  On the contrary, the annexation of Franche Comte to his kingdom was one of the favourite projects of his life.  Was he withheld by regard for his word?  Did he, who never in any other transaction of his reign showed the smallest respect for the most solemn obligations of public faith, who violated the Treaty of the Pyrenees, who violated the Treaty of Aix, who violated the Treaty of Nimeguen, who violated the Partition Treaty, who violated the Treaty of Utrecht, feel himself restrained by his word on this single occasion?  Can any person who is acquainted with his character and with his whole policy doubt that, if the neighbouring powers would have looked quietly on, he would instantly have risen in his demands?  How then stands the case?  He wished to keep Franche Comte It was not from regard to his word that he ceded Franche Comte.  Why then did he cede Franche Comte?  We answer, as all Europe answered at the time, from fear of the Triple Alliance.