“When I hear these explanations,” the Colonial Minister interjected, “I cannot suppress the suspicion, that the whole plan of our naval strategy is rotten.”
“I beg you to give your reasons for your suspicion,” the First Lord of the Admiralty replied, somewhat irritated.
“It has ever been said that England rules the waves. Now the war has been going on for a considerable time and I perceive nothing of our boasted supremacy.”
“How can you say so? Our enemies’ commerce has been completely paralysed, while our own ships carry on their trade everywhere as freely as ever.”
“That may be the case, but by naval supremacy I mean something quite different. No naval victory has as yet been gained. The enemies’ fleets are still undamaged: until they are annihilated there is always a danger that the war may take a turn prejudicial to us. Only the struggle on the open sea can decide the issue. If the English fleet is really supreme, she can force the enemies’ ships to a decisive action. Why do we not blockade the French and German fleets in their harbours, and compel them to give us battle? Our guns carry three miles, we can attack our enemies in their harbours. What is the meaning of this division of our fleet into three squadrons? Our whole fleet ought to be concentrated in the Channel, in order to deal a crushing blow.”
“The right honourable gentleman forgets that a combination of our fleet would also entail the concentration of our enemies’ fleets. If we leave our position at Copenhagen, a strong Russian fleet will proceed from Cronstadt and join the German warships in the Baltic. This united fleet could pass through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal into the North Sea. England in its naval preparations has always adopted the ‘two power standard,’ and although we have aimed at the ‘three power standard,’ our resources in money and personnel are not capable of fitting out a naval force superior to the fleets of the now three allied Powers. All the same, our own prestige holds these three Powers so far in check that they dare not attack us on the open seas. Should we not be hazarding this prestige in provoking a naval battle without a definite chance of success? This naval battle will take place, but the favourable moment must be carefully chosen. Considering the present state of the war, it would be in the highest degree frivolous to stake all upon one throw of the dice. Well, that is exactly what we should be doing were we to force on a naval conflict. If the attack failed, if our fleet suffered a defeat, England would be then exposed to the invasion of a Continental army. It is true that our fleet is weakened by being split up, but the same is also true of the fleets of our enemies, so that this apparent disadvantage is equalised. We must keep on the watch for the moment when some alteration of the present situation permits us to attack our enemies’ fleets with a superior force.”