As we have supposed the interests of one Commander to be always antagonistic to those of the other, we have assumed a true polarity.  We reserve a fuller explanation of this for another chapter, merely making the following observation on it at present.

The principle of polarity is only valid when it can be conceived in one and the same thing, where the positive and its opposite the negative completely destroy each other.  In a battle both sides strive to conquer; that is true polarity, for the victory of the one side destroys that of the other.  But when we speak of two different things which have a common relation external to themselves, then it is not the things but their relations which have the polarity.

16.  Attack and defence are things differing in kind and of unequal force.  Polarity is, therefore, not applicable to them.

If there was only one form of War, to wit, the attack of the enemy, therefore no defence; or, in other words, if the attack was distinguished from the defence merely by the positive motive, which the one has and the other has not, but the methods of each were precisely one and the same:  then in this sort of fight every advantage gained on the one side would be a corresponding disadvantage on the other, and true polarity would exist.

But action in War is divided into two forms, attack and defence, which, as we shall hereafter explain more particularly, are very different and of unequal strength.  Polarity therefore lies in that to which both bear a relation, in the decision, but not in the attack or defence itself.

If the one Commander wishes the solution put off, the other must wish to hasten it, but only by the same form of action.  If it is A’s interest not to attack his enemy at present, but four weeks hence, then it is B’s interest to be attacked, not four weeks hence, but at the present moment.  This is the direct antagonism of interests, but it by no means follows that it would be for B’s interest to attack A at once.  That is plainly something totally different.

17.  The effect of polarity is often destroyed by the superiority of the defence over the attack, and thus the suspension of action in war is explained.

If the form of defence is stronger than that of offence, as we shall hereafter show, the question arises, Is the advantage of a deferred decision as great on the one side as the advantage of the defensive form on the other?  If it is not, then it cannot by its counter-weight over-balance the latter, and thus influence the progress of the action of the War.  We see, therefore, that the impulsive force existing in the polarity of interests may be lost in the difference between the strength of the offensive and the defensive, and thereby become ineffectual.