Sec. 1.  Terms are next to be classified according to their Connotation—­that is, according to what they imply as characteristic of the things denoted.  We have seen that general names are used to denote many things in the same sense, because the things denoted resemble one another in certain ways:  it is this resemblance in certain points that leads us to class the things together and call them by the same name; and therefore the points of resemblance constitute the sense or meaning of the name, or its Connotation, and limit its applicability to such things as have these characteristic qualities.  ‘Sheep’ for example, is used in the same sense, to denote any of a multitude of animals that resemble one another:  their size, shape, woolly coats, cloven hoofs, innocent ways and edibility are well known.  When we apply to anything the term ‘sheep,’ we imply that it has these qualities:  ‘sheep,’ denoting the animal, connotes its possessing these characteristics; and, of course, it cannot, without a figure of speech or a blunder, be used to denote anything that does not possess all these qualities.  It is by a figure of speech that the term ‘sheep’ is applied to some men; and to apply it to goats would be a blunder.

Most people are very imperfectly aware of the connotation of the words they use, and are guided in using them merely by the custom of the language.  A man who employs a word quite correctly may be sadly posed by a request to explain or define it.  Moreover, so far as we are aware of the connotation of terms, the number and the kind of attributes we think of, in any given case, vary with the depth of our interest, and with the nature of our interest in the things denoted.  ‘Sheep’ has one meaning to a touring townsman, a much fuller one to a farmer, and yet a different one to a zoologist.  But this does not prevent them agreeing in the use of the word, as long as the qualities they severally include in its meaning are not incompatible.

All general names, and therefore not only class-names, like ‘sheep,’ but all attributives, have some connotation.  ‘Woolly’ denotes anything that bears wool, and connotes the fact of bearing wool; ‘innocent’ denotes anything that habitually and by its disposition does no harm (or has not been guilty of a particular offence), and connotes a harmless character (or freedom from particular guilt); ‘edible’ denotes whatever can be eaten with good results, and connotes its suitability for mastication, deglutition, digestion, and assimilation.

Sec. 2.  But whether all terms must connote as well as denote something, has been much debated.  Proper names, according to what seems the better opinion, are, in their ordinary use, not connotative.  To say that they have no meaning may seem violent:  if any one is called John Doe, this name, no doubt, means a great deal to his friends and neighbours, reminding them of his stature and physiognomy, his air and gait, his wit and wisdom, some queer stories, and an indefinite number of other things.  But all this significance is local or accidental; it only exists for those who know the individual or have heard him described:  whereas a general name gives information about any thing or person it denotes to everybody who understands the language, without any particular knowledge of the individual.