If in this age a classifier appears, he finds seven living species, which can be grouped into four genera (ABE, ABF, AC, ADH), and these again into three Families (AB, AC, AD), all forming one Order.  But the animals which were their ancestors are all extinct.  If the fossils of any of them—­say AB, ADG and AX—­can be found, he has three more species, one more genus (ADG), and one more family (AX).  For AC, which has persisted unchanged, and AX, which has become extinct, are both of them Families, each represented by only one species.  It seems necessary to treat such ancient types as species on a level with extant forms; but the naturalist draws our attention to their archaic characteristics, and tries to explain their places in the order of evolution and their relationships.

But now suppose that he could find a fossil specimen of every generation (hundreds of thousands of generations), from ABFI, etc., up to A; then, as each generation would only differ from the preceding as offspring from parents, he would be unable at any point to distinguish a species; at most, he would observe a slightly marked variety.  ABFI and ABFJ would grow more and more alike, until they became indistinguishable in ABF; ABF and ABE would merge into AB; AB, AC, AD and AX would merge into A. Hence, the appearance of species is due to our taking cross-sections of time, or comparing forms that belong to periods remote from one another (like AX, ADG, and ADHK, or AD, ADH and ADHK), and this appearance of species depends upon the destruction of ancestral intermediate forms.

(3) The hypothesis of development modifies the logical character of classification:  it no longer consists in a direct induction of co-inherent characters, but is largely a deduction of these from the characters of earlier forms, together with the conditions of variation; in other words, the definition of a species must, with the progress of science, cease to be a mere empirical law of co-inherence and become a derivative law of Causation.  But this was already implied in the position that causation is the fundamental principle of the explanation of concrete things; and accordingly, the derivative character of species or kinds extends beyond organic nature.

Sec. 9.  The classification of inorganic bodies also depends on causation.  There is the physical classification into Solids, Liquids, and Gases.  But these states of matter are dependent on temperature; at different temperatures, the same body may exist in all three states.  They cannot therefore be defined as solid, liquid, or gaseous absolutely, but only within certain degrees of temperature, and therefore as dependent upon causation.  Similarly, the geological classification of rocks, according to relative antiquity (primary, secondary, tertiary, with their subdivisions), and mode of formation (igneous and aqueous), rests upon causation; and so does the chemical classification of compound bodies according to the elements that