When the conduct of the neighbor is plainly open to interpretation, if we may not judge immediately against him, neither are we bound to give him the benefit of the doubt; we may simply suspend all judgment and await further evidence.  In our exterior dealings this suspicion should not affect our conduct, for every man has a right to be treated as an honest man and does not forfeit that right on the ground of a mere probability.  This, however, does not prevent us from taking a cue from our suspicion and acting guardedly towards him.  This does not mean that we adjudge him dishonest, but that we deem him capable of being dishonest, which is true and in accordance with the laws of prudence.

Neither are we bound to overlook all evidence that points to a man’s guilt through fear of judging him unfavorably.  It is not wrong to judge a man according to his merits, to have a right opinion of him, even when that opinion is not to his credit.  All that is necessary is that we have good reason on Which to base that opinion.  If a neighbor does evil in our presence or to our knowledge he forfeits, and justly, our good opinion; he is to blame, and not we.  We are not obliged to close our eyes to the truth of facts, and it is on facts that our judgments are formed.

CHAPTER XCII.  MENDACITY.

To lie is to utter an untruth, with full knowledge that it is an untruth.  The untruth may be expressed by any conventional sign, by word, deed, gesture, or even by silence.  Its malice and disorder consists in the opposition that exists between our idea and the expression we give to it; our words convey a meaning contrary to what is in our mind; we say one thing and mean another.  If we unwittingly utter what is contrary to fact, that is error; if we so clumsily translate our thoughts as to give a false impression of what we mean, and we do the best we can, that is a blunder; if in a moment of listlessness and inattention we speak in a manner that conflicts with our state of mind, that is temporary mental aberration.  But if we knowingly give out as truth what we know is not the truth, we lie purely and simply.

In misrepresentations of this kind it is not required that there be a plainly formulated purpose of deceiving another; an implicit intention, a disposition to allow our words to run their natural course, is sufficient to give such utterances a character of mendacity.  For, independently of our mental attitude, it is in the nature of a lie to deceive; an intention, or rather a pretense to the contrary, does not affect that nature.  The fact of lying presupposes that we intend in some manner to practise deception; if we did not have such a purpose we would not resort to lying.  If you stick a knife into a man, you may pretend what you like, but you did certainly intend to hurt him and make him feel badly.