The Tenth Commandment which forbids us to covet our neighbor’s goods, bears the same relation to the Seventh as the Ninth does to the Sixth.  It must, however, be borne in mind that all such coveting supposes injustice in desire, that is, in the means by which we desire to obtain what is not ours.  To wish for, to long ardently for something that appeals to one’s like and fancy is not sinful; the wrong consists in the desire to acquire it unjustly, to steal it, and thereby work damage unto the neighbor.  It is a natural weakness in man to be dissatisfied with what he has and to sigh after what he has not; very few of us are free from this failing.  But so long as our cravings and hankerings are not tainted with injustice, we are innocent of evil.

CHAPTER LXXXV.  PETTY THEFTS.

A question may arise as to petty thefts, venial in themselves, but oft repeated and aggregating in the long run a sum of considerable value:  how are we to deal with such cases?  Should peculations of this sort be taken singly, and their individual malice determined, without reference to the sum total of injustice caused; or should no severe judgment be passed until such a time as sufficient matter be accumulated to make the fault grievous?  In other words, is there nothing but venial sin in thefts of little values, or is there only one big sin at the end?  The difficulty is a practical one.

If petty thefts are committed with a view to amass a notable sum, the simple fact of such an intention makes the offense a mortal one.  For, as we have already remarked in treating of the human act, our deeds may be, and frequently are, vitiated by the intention we have in performing them.  If we do something with evil intent and purpose, our action is evil whether the deed in itself be indifferent or even good.  Here the intention is to cause a grave injustice; the deed is only a petty theft, but it serves as a means to a more serious offense.  The act therefore takes its malice from the purpose of the agent and becomes sinful in a high degree.

As to each repeated theft, that depends again on the intention of the culprit.  If in the course of his pilferings he no longer adverts to his first purpose and has no intention in stealing beyond that of helping himself to a little of his neighbor’s goods, he is guilty of nothing more than a venial sin.  If, however, the initial purpose is present at every act, if at every fresh peculation the intention to accumulate is renewed explicitly or implicitly, then every theft is identical with the first in malice, and the offender commits mortal sin as often as he steals.  Thus the state of soul of one who filches after this fashion is not sensibly affected by his arriving at a notable sum of injustice in the aggregate.  The malice of his conduct has already been established; it is now completed in deed.