By indirect killing we mean the placing of an act, good or at least morally indifferent, from which may result a benefit that is intended, but also an evil—­death—­which is not intended but simply suffered to occur.  In this event there is no sin, provided there be sufficient reason for permitting said evil effect.  The act may be an operation, the benefit intended, a cure; the evil risked, death.  The misery of ill health is a sufficient reason for risking the evil of death in the hope of regaining strength and health.  To escape sure death, to escape from grave danger or ills, to preserve one’s virtue, to save another’s life, to assure a great public benefit, etc., these are reasons proportionate to the evil of risking life; and in these and similar cases, if death results, it is indirect suicide, and is in nowise criminal.

The same cannot be said of death that results from abuses or excesses of any kind, such as dissipation or debauchery; from risks that are taken in a spirit of bravado or with a view to winning fame or lucre.  For a still better reason this cannot be said of those who undergo criminal operations:  it is never permitted to do what is intrinsically evil that good may come therefrom.

All this applies to self-mutilation as well as to self-destruction; as parts of the whole, one’s limbs should be the objects of one’s charity, and God’s law demands that we preserve them as well as the body itself.  It is lawful to submit to the maiming process only when the utility of the whole body demands it; otherwise it is criminal.

One word more.  What about those who call upon, and desire death?  To desire evil is sinful.  Yes, but death is a moral evil when its mode is contrary to the laws of God and of nature.  Thus, with perfect acquiescence to order of Divine Providence, if one desire death in order to be at rest with God, that one desires a good and meritorious thing and with perfect regularity; it is less meritorious to desire death with the sole view of escaping the ills and troubles of life; it would even be difficult to convict one of mortal offending if he desired death for a slight and futile reason, if there be due respect for the will of God.  The sin of such desires consists in rebellion against the divine Will and opposition to the providence of God; in such cases the sin is never anything but grievous.

CHAPTER LXX.  SELF-DEFENSE.

The thought is a terrible one—­and the act is desperate in itself—­of a man, however justified his conduct may be, slaying with his own hand a fellow being and sending his soul, unprepared perhaps, before its Maker.  But it is a still more desperate thing, because it strikes us nearer home, to yield up one’s life into the hands of an agent of injustice.  There is here an alternative of two very great evils; it is a question of two lives, his and mine; I must slay or I must die without having done anything to forfeit my life.