The “profound study” which Spencer has made in Justice—­(and, let us say between parentheses, this work, together with his “Positive and Negative Beneficence” furnishes sad evidence of the senile mental retrogression that even Herbert Spencer has been unable to escape; moreover its subjective aridity is in strange contrast with the marvelous wealth of scientific evidence poured forth in his earlier works)—­is based on these two arguments:  I. The present landed proprietors are not the direct descendants of the first conquerors; they have, in general, acquired their titles by free contract; II.  Society is entitled to the ownership of the virgin soil, as it was before it was cleared, before any improvements or buildings were put upon it by private owners; the indemnity which would have to be paid for these improvements would reach an enormous figure.

The answer is that the first argument would hold good if socialism proposed to punish the present owners; but the question presents itself in a different form.  Society places the expropriation of the owners of land on the ground of “public utility,” and the individual right must give way before the rights of society.  Just as it does at present, leaving out of consideration for the moment the question of indemnity.  To reply to the second argument, in the first place, it must not be forgotten that the improvements are not exclusively the work of the personal exertions of the owners.  They represent, at first, an enormous accumulation of fatigue and blood that many generations of laborers have left upon the soil, in order to bring it to its present state of cultivation ... and all of this for the profit of others; there is also this fact to be remembered that society itself, the social life, has been a great factor in producing these improvements (or increased values), since public roads, railways, the use of machinery in agriculture, etc., have been the means of bestowing freely upon the landowners large unearned increments that have greatly swollen the prices of their lands.

Why, finally, if we are to consider the amount and the character of this indemnity, should this indemnity be total and absolute?  Why, even under present conditions, if a landowner, for various reasons, such as cherished memories connected with the land, values it at a sentimental price, he would be forced under the right of eminent domain to accept the market value, without any extra payment for his affection or sentiment.  It would be just the same in the case of the collective appropriation which would, moreover, be facilitated by the progressive concentration of the land in the hands of a few great landed proprietors.  If we were to assure these proprietors, for the term of the natural lives, a comfortable and tranquil life, it would suffice to make the indemnity meet all the requirements of the most rigorous equity.

[54] LORIA, La Teoria economica della constituzione politica, Turin, 1886. p. 141.  The second edition of this work has appeared in French, considerably enlarged:  Les bases economiques de la constitution sociale, Paris, 1893. (This has also been translated into English.—­Tr.)