Again:  Can the Allies present a united front or carry on a uniform line of conduct?  Will not their interests overlap and cause an inevitable conflict, even when intentions are of the very best?

France, for example, competes with England in chemicals, surgical instruments, high-speed tools, scores of things; Russia’s competitors in wheat are not Germany, but Canada, India and Australia; Italy and France are rivals for the same wine markets.  Russia for years has kept down the high cost of her living by buying cheap German goods at her front door and having her projects financed by German capital.  Will she face bankruptcy by going hundreds—­even thousands—­of miles out of her way and paying more for products?  England for years has made huge profits out of the re-export of Teutonic articles, thanks to the grace of free trade and huge carrying power.  Is she likely to forego all this?

In the last analysis Propinquity and the Purse are the Mothers of Trade Alliance.

Finally, will not any organised exclusion of German products, coupled with a definite and organised campaign to throttle German trade the world over, throw the business of the Kaiser’s country smack into the lap of the United States?  Sober reflection over these possibilities may stay economic reprisal.

On the other hand, there are many ways by which even a near translation of the economic pact into actuality may work hardship—­even disaster—­to American commercial interests.  No matter which way we turn when peace comes we shall face the proverbial millstones in the shape of two great alliances.  One is the Allied Group, jealous of our new wealth and world power, bitter with the belief that we have coined gold out of agony; the other is the Teutonic Union, smarting because of our aid to its enemies, stinging under reverses, mad with a desire to recuperate.

Examine our trade relations with warring Europe and you see how hazardous a shift in old-time relations would be.  To the fighting peoples and their colonies in normal times we send nearly seventy-eight per cent of our exports, and from them we derive seventy per cent of our exports.  The Allies alone, principally England and her colonies, get sixty-three per cent of these exports and send us fifty-four per cent of all we get from foreign lands.

As the National Foreign-Trade Council of the United States points out:  “Any sweeping change of tariff, navigation or financial policy on the part of either group of the Allies, and particularly on the part of the Entente Allies, may seriously affect the domestic prosperity of the United States, in which foreign trade is a vital element.”

Why is this foreign trade so vital?  Because, during these last two years of world upheaval we have rolled up the immense favourable trade balance of over three billion dollars.  In peace time this would be paid for in merchandise.  But fighting Europe’s industries, with the exception of a part of England’s, are mobilised for munitions.  Therefore, these goods have been paid for largely in gold.