These men were assembled to fix the price of all this blood and sacrifice, and they did.  In what has come to be known as the Paris Pact they bound themselves together by economic ties and pledged themselves to present a united economic front.  They unfurled the banner of aggressive reprisal with the sole object of crushing the one-time business supremacy of their foes.

The chief recommendations were:  To meet, by tariff discrimination, boycott or otherwise, any individual or organised trade advance of the Central Powers—­already Germany, Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria have reached a commercial understanding; to forego any “favoured-nation” relation with the enemy for an indefinite period; to conserve for themselves, “before all others,” their natural resources during the period of reconstruction; to make themselves independent of enemy countries in the raw materials and manufactured products essential to their economic well-being; and to facilitate this exchange by preferential trade among themselves, and by special and state subsidies to shipping, railroads and telegraphs.  Another important decree prohibits the enemy from engaging in certain industries and professions, such as dyestuffs, in allied countries when these industries relate to national defence or economic independence.

In short, self-sufficiency became the aim of the whole allied group, to be achieved without the aid or consent of any other nation or group of nations, be they friends or foes.

Here, then, is the strategy that will rule after the war.  A huge allied monopoly is projected—­a sort of monster militant trust, with cabinets of ministers for directorates, armies and navies as trade scouts, and whole roused citizenships for salesmen.

Throughout this new Bill of World Trade Rights there is scant mention of neutrals—­no reference at all to the greatest of non-belligerent nations.  Yet the document is packed with interest, fraught even with highest concern, for us.  Upon the ability to be translated into offensive and defensive reality will depend a large part of our future international commercial relations.

Is the Paris Pact practical?  Will it withstand the logical pressure of business demand and supply when the war is ended?  How will it affect American trade?

To try to get the answer I talked with many men in England and France who were intimately concerned.  Some had sat in the conference; others had helped to shape its approach; still others were dedicated to its far-spreading purpose.  I found an astonishing conflict of opinion.  Even those who had attended this most momentous of all economic conferences were sceptical about complete results.  Yet no one questioned the intent to smash enemy trade.  Will our interests be pinched at the same time?

Regardless of what any European statesman may say to the contrary, one deduction of supreme significance to us arises out of the whole proposition.  Summed up, it is this: