A Convention had been elected in Kansas to frame a State Constitution.  It represented only a fraction of the people, since, for some reason good or bad, the opponents of slavery did not vote in the election.  But it was understood that whatever Constitution was framed would be submitted to the popular vote.  The Convention framed a Constitution legalising slavery, and its proposals came before Congress backed by the influence of Buchanan.  Under them the people of Kansas were to vote whether they would have this Constitution as it stood, or have it with the legalisation of slavery restricted to the slaves who had then been brought into the territory.  No opportunity was to be given them of rejecting the Constitution altogether, though Governor Walker, himself in favor of slavery, assured the President that they wished to do so.  Ultimately, by way of concession to vehement resistance, the majority in Congress passed an Act under which the people in Kansas were to vote simply for or against the slavery Constitution as it stood, only—­if they voted for it, they as a State were to be rewarded with a large grant of public lands belonging to the Union in their territory.  Eventually the Kansas people, unmoved by this bribe, rejected the Constitution by a majority of more than 11,000 to 1,800.  Now, the Southern leaders, three years before, had eagerly joined with Douglas to claim a right of free choice for the Kansas people.  The shamelessness of this attempt to trick them out of it is more significant even than the tale of Preston Brooks.  There was no hot blood there; the affair was quietly plotted by respected leaders of the South.  They were men in many ways of character and honour, understood by weak men like Buchanan to represent the best traditions of American public life.  But, as they showed also in other instances that cannot be related here, slavery had become for them a sacred cause which hallowed almost any means.  It is essential to remember this in trying to understand the then political situation.

Douglas here behaved very honourably.  He, with his cause of popular sovereignty, could not have afforded to identify himself with the fraud on Kansas, but he was a good enough trickster to have made his protest safely if he had cared to do so.  As it was he braved the hatred of Buchanan and the fury of his Southern friends by instant, manly, courageous, and continued opposition.  It may therefore seem an ungracious thing that, immediately after this, Lincoln should have accepted the invitation of his friends to oppose Douglas’ re-election.  To most of the leading Republicans out of Illinois it seemed altogether unwise and undesirable that their party, which had seemed to be losing ground, should do anything but welcome Douglas as an ally.  Of these Seward indeed went too far for his friends, and in his sanguine hope that it would work for freedom was ready to submit to the doctrine of “popular sovereignty”; but, except the austere Chase, now Governor of Ohio, who this once, but unfortunately not again, was whole-heartedly with Lincoln, the Republican leaders in the East, and great Republican journals, like the Tribune, declared their wish that Douglas should be re-elected.  Why, then, did Lincoln stand against him?