Sherman set out from Chattanooga on the day when Grant crossed the Rapidan.  Joseph Johnston barred his way in one entrenched position after another.  Sherman, with greater caution than Grant, or perhaps with greater facilities of ground, manoeuvred him out of each position in turn, pushing him slowly back along the line of the railway towards Atlanta, the great manufacturing centre of Georgia, one hundred and twenty miles south by east from Chattanooga.  Only once, towards the end of June at Kenesaw Mountain, some twenty miles north of Atlanta, did he attack Johnston’s entrenchments, causing himself some unnecessary loss and failing in his direct attack on them, but probably thinking it necessary to show that he would attack whenever needed.  Johnston has left a name as a master of defensive warfare, and doubtless delayed and hampered Sherman as much as he could.  Jefferson Davis angrily and unwisely sent General Hood to supersede him.  This less prudent officer gave battle several times, bringing up the Confederate loss before Atlanta fell to 34,000 against 30,000 on the other side, and being, by great skill on Sherman’s part, compelled to evacuate Atlanta on September 2.

By this time there had occurred the last and most brilliant exploit of old Admiral Farragut, who on August 5 in a naval engagement of extraordinarily varied incident, had possessed himself of the harbour of Mobile, with its forts, though the town remained as a stronghold in Confederate hands and prevented a junction with Sherman which would have quite cut the Confederacy in two.

Nearer Washington, too, a memorable campaign was in process.  For three weeks after Early’s unwelcome visit, military mismanagement prevailed near Washington.  Early was able to turn on his pursuers, and a further raid, this time into Pennsylvania, took place.  Grant was too far off to exercise control except through a sufficiently able subordinate, which Hunter was not.  Halleck, as in a former crisis, did not help matters.  Lincoln, though at this time he issued a large new call for recruits, was unwilling any longer to give military orders.  Just now his political anxieties had reached their height.  His judgment was never firmer, but friends thought his strength was breaking under the strain.  On this and on all grounds he was certainly wise to decline direct interference in military affairs.  On August 1 Grant ordered General Philip H. Sheridan to the Shenandoah on temporary duty, expressing a wish that he should be put “in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy or follow him to the death.”  Lincoln telegraphed to Grant, quoting this despatch and adding, “This I think is exactly right; but please look over the despatches you may have received from here even since you made that order and see if there is any idea in the head of any one here of putting our army south of the enemy or following him to the death in any direction.  I repeat to you it will