in the perpetual assertion that the quotas were unfair.  No complaint as to this had been raised before the riots.  It seems that a quite unintended error may in fact at first have been made.  Lincoln, however, immediately reduced the quotas in question to the full extent which the alleged error would have required.  Fresh complaints from Seymour followed, and so on to the end.  Ultimately Seymour was invited to come to Washington and have out the whole matter of his complaints in conference with Stanton.  Like a prudent man, he again refused to face personal conference.  It seems that Governor Seymour, who was a great person in his day, was very decidedly, in the common acceptance of the term, a gentleman.  This has been counted unto him for righteousness.  It should rather be treated as an aggravation of his very unmeritable conduct.

Thus, since the Proclamation of Emancipation the North had again become possessed of what is sometimes considered a necessity of good government, an organised Opposition ready and anxious to take the place of the existing Administration.  It can well be understood that honourable men entered into this combination, but it is difficult to conceive on what common principle they could hold together which would not have been disastrous in its working.  The more extreme leaders, who were likely to prove the driving force among them, were not unfitly satirised in a novel of the time called the “Man Without a Country.”  Their chance of success in fact depended upon the ill-fortune of their country in the war and on the irritation against the Government, which could be aroused by that cause alone and not by such abuses as they fairly criticised.  In the latter part of 1863 the war was going well.  A great meeting of “Union men” was summoned in August in Illinois.  Lincoln was tempted to go and speak to them, but he contented himself with a letter.  Phrases in it might suggest the stump orator, more than in fact his actual stump speeches usually did.  In it, however, he made plain in the simplest language the total fallacy of such talk of peace as had lately become common; the Confederacy meant the Confederate army and the men who controlled it; as a fact no suggestion of peace or compromise came from them; if it ever came, the people should know it.  In equally simple terms he sought to justify, even to supporters of the Union who did not share his “wish that all men could be free,” his policy in regard to emancipation.  In any case, freedom had for the sake of the Union been promised to negroes who were now fighting or working for the North, “and the promise being made must be kept.”  As that most critical year of the war drew to a close there was a prevailing recognition that the rough but straight path along which the President groped his way was the right path, and upon the whole he enjoyed a degree of general favour which was not often his portion.

3. The War in 1864.