from Washington. Hooker, on first learning that
Lee had crossed the Rappahannock, entertained the
thought of himself going south of it and attacking
Richmond. Lincoln dissuaded him, since he might
be “entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped
half over a fence”; he could not take Richmond
for weeks, and his communications might be cut; besides,
Lincoln added, his true objective point throughout
was Lee’s army and not Richmond. Hooker’s
later movements, in conformity with what he could
gather of Lee’s movements, were prudent and skilful.
He rejected a later suggestion of Lincoln’s
that he should strike quickly at the most assailable
point in Lee’s lengthening line of communications,
and he was wise, for Lee could live on the country
he was traversing, and Hooker now aimed at covering
Philadelphia or Baltimore and Washington, according
to the direction which Lee might take, watching all
the while for the moment to strike. He found
himself hampered in some details by probably injudicious
orders of his superior, Halleck, and became irritable
and querulous; Lincoln had to exercise his simple
arts to keep him to his duty and to soothe him, and
was for the moment successful. Suddenly on June
27, with a battle in near prospect, Hooker sent in
his resignation; probably he meant it, but there was
no time to debate the matter. Probably he had
lost confidence in himself, as he did before at Chancellorsville.
Lincoln evidently judged that his state of mind made
it wise to accept this resignation. He promptly
appointed in Hooker’s place one of his subordinates,
General George Meade, a lean, tall, studious, somewhat
sharp-tongued man, not brilliant or popular or the
choice that the army would have expected, but with
a record in previous campaigns which made him seem
to Lincoln trustworthy, as he was. A subordinate
command in which he could really distinguish himself
was later found for Hooker, who now took leave of
his army in words of marked generosity towards Meade.
All this while there was great excitement in the
North. Urgent demands had been raised for the
recall of McClellan, a course of which, Lincoln justly
observed, no one could measure the inconvenience so
well as he.
Lee was now feeling his way, somewhat in the dark
as to his enemy’s movements, because he had
despatched most of his cavalry upon raiding expeditions
towards the important industrial centre of Harrisburg.
Meade continued on a parallel course to him, with
his army spread out to guard against any movements
of Lee’s to the eastward. Each commander
would have preferred to fight the other upon the defensive.
Suddenly on July 1, three days after Meade had taken
command, a chance collision took place north of the
town of Gettysburg between the advance guards of the
two armies. It developed into a general engagement,
of which the result must partly depend on the speed
with which each commander could bring up the remainder
of his army. On the first day Lee achieved a