Demands for an impossible number of reinforcements continued.  Lincoln explained to McClellan a few days later that they were impossible, and added:  “If in your frequent mention of responsibility you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such an impression.  I only beg that, in like manner, you will not ask impossibilities of me.”  Much argument upon Lincoln’s next important act may be saved by the simple observations that the problem in regard to the defence of Washington was real, that McClellan’s propensity to ask for the impossible was also real, and that Lincoln’s patient and loyal attitude to him was real too.

Five days after his arrival at Harrison’s Landing, McClellan wrote Lincoln a long letter.  It was a treatise upon Lincoln’s political duties.  It was written as “on the brink of eternity.”  He was not then in fact in any danger, and possibly he had composed it seven days before as his political testament; and apprehensions, free from personal fear, excuse, without quite redeeming, its inappropriateness.  The President is before all things not to abandon the cause.  But the cause should be fought for upon Christian principles.  Christian principles exclude warfare on private property.  More especially do they exclude measures for emancipating slaves.  And if the President gives way to radical views on slavery, he will get no soldiers.  Then follows a mandate to the President to appoint a Commander-in-Chief, not necessarily the writer.  Such a summary does injustice to a certain elevation of tone in the letter, but that elevation is itself slightly strained.  McClellan, whatever his private opinions, had not meddled with politics before he left Washington.  The question why in this military crisis he should have written what a Democratic politician might have composed as a party manifesto must later have caused Lincoln some thought, but it apparently did not enter into the decision he next took.  He arrived himself at Harrison’s Landing next day.  McClellan handed him the letter.  Lincoln read it, and said that he was obliged to him.  McClellan sent a copy to his wife as “a very important record.”

Lincoln had come in order to learn the views of McClellan and all his corps commanders.  They differed a good deal on important points, but a majority of them were naturally anxious to stay and fight there.  Lincoln was left in some anxiety as to how the health of the troops would stand the climate of the coming months if they had to wait long where they were.  He was also disturbed by McClellan’s vagueness about the number of his men, for he now returned as present for duty a number which far exceeded that which some of his recent telegrams had given and yet fell short of the number sent him by an amount which no reasonable estimate of killed, wounded, and sick could explain.  This added to Lincoln’s doubt on the main question presented to him.  McClellan believed that he could take Richmond, but he demanded for this very large reinforcements.  Some part of them were already being collected, but the rest could by no means be given him without leaving Washington with far fewer troops to defend it than McClellan or anybody else had hitherto thought necessary.