Potomac where it lay, but they did think that with a further 50,000 or 60,000 they might successfully invade Maryland, crossing higher up the Potomac, and by drawing McClellan away from his present position, get a chance of defeating him.  The Southern President came to Manassas, at their invitation, on October 1, but he did not think well to withdraw the trained men whom he could have sent to Johnston from the various points in the South at which they were stationed; he may have had good reasons but it is likely that he sacrificed one of the best chances of the South.  McClellan’s army was soon in as good a state of preparation as Johnston’s.  Early in October McClellan had, on his own statement, over 147,000 men at his disposal; Joseph Johnston, on his own statement, under 47,000.  Johnston was well informed as to McClellan’s numbers—­very likely he could get information from Maryland more easily than McClellan from Virginia.  The two armies lay not twenty-five miles apart.  The weather and the roads were good to the end of December; the roads were practicable by March and they seem to have been so all the time.  As spring approached, it appeared to the Southern generals that McClellan must soon advance.  Johnston thought that his right flank was liable to be turned and the railway communications south of Manassas liable to be cut.  In the course of February it was realised that his position was too dangerous; the large stores accumulated there were removed; and when, early in March, there were reports of unusual activity in the Northern camp, Johnston, still expecting attack from the same direction, began his retreat.  On March 9 it was learned in Washington that Manassas had been completely evacuated.  McClellan marched his whole army there, and marched it back.  Johnston withdrew quietly behind the Rapidan River, some 30 miles further south, and to his surprise was left free from any pursuit.

For months past the incessant report in the papers, “all quiet upon the Potomac,” had been getting upon the nerves of the North.  The gradual conversion of their pride in an imposing army into puzzled rage at its inactivity has left a deeper impression on Northern memories than the shock of disappointment at Bull Run.  Public men of weight had been pressing for an advance in November, and when the Joint Committee of Congress, an arbitrary and meddlesome, but able and perhaps on the whole useful body, was set up in December, it brought its full influence to bear on the President.  Lincoln was already anxious enough; he wished to rouse McClellan himself to activity, while he screened him against excessive impatience or interference with his plans.  It is impossible to say what was McClellan’s real mind.  Quite early he seems to have held out hopes to Lincoln that he would soon attack, but he was writing to his wife that he expected to be attacked by superior numbers.  It is certain, however, that he was possessed now and always by a delusion as to the enemy’s strength.