20.  The New York Tribune, which was edited by Mr. Horace Greeley, a vigorous writer whose omniscience was unabated by the variation of his own opinion, was the one journal of far-reaching influence in the North; and it only gave exaggerated point to a general feeling when it declared that the Confederate Congress must not meet.  The Senators and Congressmen now in Washington were not quite so exacting, but they had come there unanimous in their readiness to vote taxes and support the war in every way, and they wanted to see something done; and they wanted it all the more because the three months’ service of the militia was running out.  General Scott, still the chief military adviser of Government, was quite distinct in his preference for waiting and for perfecting the discipline and organisation of the volunteers, who had not yet even been formed into brigades.  On the militia he set no value at all.  For long he refused to countenance any but minor movements preparatory to a later advance.  It is not quite certain, however, that Congress and public opinion were wrong in clamouring for action.  The Southern troops were not much, if at all, more ready for use than the Northerners; and Jefferson Davis and his military adviser, Lee, desired time for their defensive preparations.  It was perhaps too much to expect that the country after its great uprising should be content to give supplies and men without end while nothing apparently happened; and the spirit of the troops themselves might suffer more from inaction than from defeat.  A further thought, while it made defeat seem more dangerous, made battle more tempting.  There was fear that European Powers might recognise the Southern Confederacy and enter into relations with it.  Whether they did so depended on whether they were confirmed in their growing suspicion that the North could not conquer the South.  Balancing the military advice which was given them as to the risk against this political importunity, Lincoln and his Cabinet chose the risk, and Scott at length withdrew his opposition.  Lincoln was possibly more sensitive to pressure than he afterwards became, more prone to treat himself as a person under the orders of the people, but there is no reason to doubt that he acted on his own sober judgment as well as that of his Cabinet.  Whatever degree of confidence he reposed in Scott, Scott was not very insistent; the risk was not overwhelming; the battle was very nearly won, would have been won if the orders of Scott had been carried out.  No very great harm in fact followed the defeat of Bull Run; and the danger of inaction was real.  He was probably then, as he certainly was afterwards, profoundly afraid that the excessive military caution which he often encountered would destroy the cause of the North by disheartening the people who supported the war.  That is no doubt a kind of fear to which many statesmen are too prone, but Lincoln’s sense of real popular feeling throughout the wide extent of the North is agreed to have been uncommonly sure.  Definite judgment on such a question is impossible, but probably Lincoln and his Cabinet were wise.