about.  Lincoln gave Seward some proper cautions and left him all proper freedom; but it is possible that he once told Douglas that he intended, at that moment, to evacuate Fort Sumter.  The upshot of the matter is that the decision of the Government was delayed by negotiations which, as it ought to have known, could come to nothing, and that the Southern Government and the Commissioners, after they had got home, thought they had been deceived in these negotiations.

Discussions were still proceeding as to Fort Sumter when a fresh difficulty arose for Lincoln, but one which enabled him to become henceforth master in his Cabinet.  The strain of Seward’s position upon a man inclined to be vain and weak can easily be imagined, but the sudden vagary in which it now resulted was surprising.  Upon April 1 he sent to Lincoln “Some Thoughts for the President’s Consideration.”  In this paper, after deploring what he described as the lack of any policy so far, and defining, in a way that does not matter, his attitude as to the forts in the South, he proceeded thus:  “I would demand explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America, to raise a vigorous spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention, and if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France, would convene Congress and declare war against them.”  In other words, Seward would seek to end all domestic dissensions by suddenly creating out of nothing a dazzling foreign policy.  But this was not the only point, even if it was the main point; he proceeded:  “Either the President must do it” (that is the sole conduct of this policy) “himself, or devolve it on some member of his Cabinet.  It is not my especial province.  But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility.”  In other words, Seward put himself forward as the sole director of the Government.  In his brief reply Lincoln made no reference whatever to Seward’s amazing programme.  He pointed out that the policy so far, as to which Seward had complained, was one in which Seward had entirely concurred.  As to the concluding demand that some one man, and that man Seward, should control all policy, he wrote, “If this must be done, I must do it.  When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being changed without good reason, or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all the Cabinet.”  Seward was not a fool, far from it; he was one of the ablest men in America, only at that moment strained and excited beyond the limits of his good sense.  Lincoln’s quiet answer sobered him then and for ever after.  He showed a generous mind; he wrote to his wife soon after:  “Executive force and vigour are rare qualities; the President is the best of us.”  And Lincoln’s generosity was no less; his private secretary, Nicolay, saw these papers; but no other man knew anything of Seward’s abortive rebellion against Lincoln till after they both were dead.  The story needs no explanation, but the more attentively all the circumstances are considered, the more Lincoln’s handling of this emergency, which threatened the ruin of his Government, throws into shade the weakness he had hitherto shown.