A conversational party even of tolerably well-educated persons, often presents itself in a ludicrous light.  Some question has arisen amongst them.  No one has any clear or definite information upon it.  They have had disputes about the simplest matters of fact involved in it.  Yet no person there, down to the youngest, but would take scorn to be held as incapable of pronouncing upon it.  There are as many opinions as there are persons present, and not one less confident than another.  What is very natural in such circumstances, no one has the least respect for the opinions of any of the rest.  Each, in fact, does justice upon his neighbour for the absurdity of pronouncing without grounds, while incapable of seeing the absurdity in himself.  And thus an hour will be passed in a most unprofitable manner, and perhaps the social spirit of the company be not a little marred.  How much better to say:  ’Well, that is a subject I know nothing about:  I will not undertake to judge.’  Supposing all who are present to be in the same predicament, they might dismiss the barren subject, and start another on which some one could throw real light, and from which, accordingly, all might derive some benefit.

Is not this habit of pronouncing without preparation in inquiry and reflection just one of the causes of that remarkable diversity of opinion which is so often deplored for its unpleasant consequences?  In ignorance—­fancy, whim, and prejudice usurp the directing power.  If we take no time for consideration, we shall be apt to plunge into an error, and afterwards persevere in it for the sake of consistency, or because it has become a thing which we regard as our own.  In such circumstances, no wonder there are as many ‘minds’ as ‘men.’  But when any one can speak on the ground of well-ascertained facts, and after some deliberation on the bearings of the question, he must carry others with him, not by fascination, but by real conviction, and thus greatly reduce the proportion of opinions to men.  Very likely, some other man has got hold of a somewhat different range of facts, and come to different conclusions:  he, too, will have his party of followers.  But there being two or three discrepant views on the subject, is a much less evil than there being as many as there are individuals.

The right of pronouncing upon public affairs is one that would be particularly clung to if there were any danger of its being lost, and it certainly is not in England that any writer would be found ready to challenge so valued a privilege.  At the same time, no one will seriously deny, that if this right were used more generally with the advantage of a tolerable knowledge of the subject, it would be an improvement.  Public men may be acting, as, indeed, they must generally do, upon certain data carefully brought out by inquiry:  they may judge and act amiss after all, for human judgment is fallible.  But when we contrast their means of forming a judgment with those of many persons