“In the charge of oppression, although supported by the cries of the people and the most authentic representations, it is yet impossible, in most cases, to obtain legal proofs of it; and unless the discretionary power which I have recommended be somewhere lodged, the assurance of impunity from any formal inquiry will baffle every order of the board; as, on the other hand, the fear of the consequences will restrain every man within the bounds of his duty, if he knows himself liable to suffer by the effects of a single control.”

My Lords, you see two things most material for you to consider in the judgment of this great cause, which is the cause of nations.  The first thing for you to consider is the declaration of the culprit at your bar, that a person may be pursued by the cries of a whole people,—­that documents the most authentic and satisfactory, but deficient in technical form, may be produced against him,—­in short, that he may be guilty of the most enormous crimes,—­and yet that legal proofs may be wanting.  This shows you how seriously you ought to consider, before you reject any proof upon the idea that it is not technical legal proof.  To this assertion of Mr. Hastings I oppose, however, the opinion of a gentleman who sits near his side, Mr. Sumner, which is much more probable.

Mr. Hastings says, that the power of the Council is not effectual against the inferior servants, that [it?] is too weak to coerce them.  With much more truth Mr. Sumner has said, in his minute, you might easily coerce the inferior servants, but that the dread of falling upon persons in high stations discourages and puts an end to complaint.  I quote the recorded authority of the gentleman near him, as being of great weight in the affairs of the Company, to prove what is infinitely more probable, the falsehood of Mr. Hastings’s assertion, that an inferior servant cannot be coerced, and that they must riot with impunity in the spoils of the people.

But we will go to a much more serious part of the business.  After desiring arbitrary power in this letter, he desires a perpetuation of it.  And here he has given you a description of a bad Governor, to which I must call your attention, as your Lordships will find it, in every part of his proceeding, to be exactly applicable to himself and to his own government.

“The first command of a state so extensive as that of Bengal is not without opportunities of private emoluments; and although the allowance which your bounty has liberally provided for your servants may be reasonably expected to fix the bounds of their desires, yet you will find it extremely difficult to restrain men from profiting by other means, who look upon their appointment as the measure of a day, and who, from the uncertainty of their condition, see no room for any acquisition but of wealth, since reputation and the consequences which follow the successful conduct of great affairs are only to be attained in a course of years.