The forenoon passed in manoeuvres, skilfully timed, to insure a definite issue.  At 11.50 Rodney considered that his opportunity had arrived.  Both fleets were then heading in the same direction, on the starboard tack, and he had again succeeded in so placing his own that, by the words of his report, he expected to bring “the whole force of His Majesty’s fleet against the enemy’s rear, and of course part of their centre, by which means the twenty sail of British ships would have been opposed to only fifteen sail of the enemy’s, and must in all probability have totally disabled them before their van could have given them any assistance.”  It would be difficult to cite a clearer renouncement of the outworn “van to van,” ship to ship, dogma; but Rodney is said to have expressed himself in more emphatic terms subsequently, as follows:  “During all the commands Lord Rodney has been entrusted with, he made it a rule to bring his whole force against a part of the enemy’s, and never was so absurd as to bring ship against ship, when the enemy gave him an opportunity of acting otherwise.”  Though not distinctly so stated, it would seem that his first movement on the present occasion had failed because of the long distance between the fleets permitting the enemy to succor the part threatened, before he could close.  He was now nearer, for at this second attempt only an hour proved to be needed for the first British ship to open fire at long range.  It may be for this reason, also, that he at this stage threw himself upon his captains, no longer prescribing the successive movements, but issuing the general signal to bear down, each vessel to “steer,” according to the 21st Article of the Additional Fighting Instructions, “for the ship of the enemy which from the disposition of the two squadrons it must be her lot to engage, notwithstanding the signal for the line ahead will be kept flying:  making or shortening sail in such proportion as to preserve the distance assigned by the signal for the line, in order that the whole squadron may, as near as possible, come into action at the same time.”

Unfortunately for his manoeuvre, the Admiral here ran up against the stolid idea of the old—­and still existing—­Fighting Instructions concerning the line-of-battle in action, embodied in a typical representative in the senior captain of his fleet.  This gentleman, Robert Carkett, had risen from before the mast, and after a lieutenancy of thirteen years had become post in 1758, by succeeding to the command when his captain was killed, in one of the most heroic single-ship fights of the British navy.  Unluckily, his seniority gave him the lead of the fleet as it was now formed on the starboard tack, and he considered that the signal for attacking the enemy’s rear was annulled by the present situation.  “Both fleets,” he stated in a letter to the Admiralty, “were at 11.15 parallel to and abreast of each other.  As I was then the leading ship, it became