Rodney has therefore a singularly well defined place among British naval chiefs.  He was to oppose form to form, theory to theory, evolution to evolution, upon the battle ground of the sea; with purpose throughout tactically offensive, not defensive, and facing an adversary his equal in professional equipment.  Had he arrived a year before he would have met no fair match in D’Estaing, a soldier, not a sailor, whose deficiencies as a seaman would have caused a very different result from that which actually followed his encounter with Byron, who in conduct showed an utter absence of ideas and of method inconceivable in Rodney.  The French were now commanded by De Guichen, considered the most capable of their officers by Rodney, whose recent abode in Paris had probably familiarized him with professional reputations among the enemy.  Everything therefore conspired to make the occasion one eminently fitted to his capacities.  Such are the conditions—­the man and the hour—­that make reputations; though they do not form characters, which are growths of radically different origin.

De Guichen put to sea from Martinique on April 15th, with a convoy for Santo Domingo which he intended to see clear of British interference.  Rodney, whose anchorage was but thirty miles away, learned instantly the French sailing and followed without delay.  On the evening of April 16th, the two fleets were in sight of each other to leeward of Martinique, the British to windward; an advantage that was diligently maintained during the night.  At daylight of the 17th the two enemies were twelve to fifteen miles apart, ranged on nearly parallel lines, the British twenty heading northwest, the French twenty-three southeast.  The numerical difference represents sufficiently nearly the actual difference of force, although French vessels averaged more powerful than British of the same rates.

At 6.45 A.M.  Rodney signalled that it was his intention to attack the enemy’s rear with his whole force.  This was never annulled, and the purpose governed his action throughout the day.  This combination—­on the rear—­is the one generally preferable to be attempted when underway, and the relative situations of the fleets at this moment made it particularly opportune; for the British, in good order, two cables interval between the ships, were abreast the rear centre and rear of the enemy, whose line was in comparison greatly extended,—­the result probably of inferior practical seamanship.  To increase his advantage, Rodney at 7 ordered his vessels to close to one cable, and at 8.30, when the antagonists were still heading as at daybreak, undertook to lead the fleet down by a series of signals directive of its successive movements.  In this he was foiled by De Guichen, who by wearing brought what was previously his van into position to support the extreme threatened.  “The different movements of the enemy,” wrote Rodney, “obliged me to be very attentive and watch every opportunity of attacking them at advantage;” a sentence that concisely sums up his special excellencies, of which the present occasion offers the most complete illustration.  It may be fully conceded also that it would have vindicated his high title to fame by conspicuous results, had the intelligence of his officers seconded his dispositions.