The general conditions being as described, the fighting in the naval campaign of 1759 began in the Mediterranean.  On June 8th Boscawen, having driven two French frigates into a fortified bay near Toulon, attacked them with three ships-of-the-line.  The attack failed, and the British ships were badly injured; a timely lesson on the general inexpediency of attacking shore batteries with vessels, unless for special and adequate reasons of probable advantage.  In July he returned to Gibraltar, to refit and for provisions.  In the absence of details, positive criticism is unwarranted; but it is impossible not to note the difference between this step, during summer weather, and the Toulon blockades of Lord St. Vincent, who, when before Brest, modelled his course upon that of Hawke.  The port being thus left open, De la Clue sailed on the 5th of August for Brest.  On the 17th he was near the straits of Gibraltar, hugging the African coast, and falling night gave promise of passing unseen, when a British lookout frigate caught sight of his squadron.  She hauled in for Gibraltar at once, firing signal guns.  Boscawen’s ships were in the midst of repairs, mostly dismantled; but, the emergency not being unforeseen, spars and sails were sent rapidly aloft, and within three hours they were underway in pursuit.  The French division separated during the night.  Five ships put into Cadiz.  The British next morning caught sight of the remaining seven, among which was the admiral, and a sharp chase resulted in the destruction of five.  From August 18th the Toulon fleet was eliminated from the campaign; though the vessels in Cadiz remained to the end a charge upon Hawke’s watchfulness, similar to that caused by the enemy’s divisions expected from America.

That one of the latter was already on its way home, under the command of Commodore Bompart, was notified to our admiral on September 21st by a despatch from England.  He immediately sent a division of heavy ships to reinforce the light squadron to the southward.  “If the alarm is great now,” he said, “it will be much greater if he get into Rochefort.”  Further information from the West Indies contradicted the first report, and on October 10th Hawke recalled the ships-of-the-line, apparently at the wish of the Admiralty; for he expresses his regret at doing so, and asks for more of the “many ships” then in England, that Rochefort may be blocked as well as Brest.  The incident has now little importance, except as indicating the general national nervousness, and the difficulty under which he labored through force inadequate to the numerous and exacting duties entailed by constant holding the sea in war.  From this point of view it bears upon his conduct.