of maintaining the rendezvous fixed by him, “A single ship may struggle with a hard gale of wind when a squadron cannot.  In working against a strong westerly gale in the Channel, where it cannot make very long stretches,”—­because it finds shores and shoals on either side,—­“it must always by wearing lose ground, but more especially if it should so blow as to put it past carrying sail.”  The method used by Hawke was not only an innovation on all past practice, but, as has before been said, constituted the pattern whereon were framed the great blockades of the Napoleonic period, which strangled both the naval efficiency and the commercial and financial resources of the Empire.  These were but developments of Hawke’s fine achievement of 1759; the prestige of originality belongs to him.  Even their success, with better ships and the improvement of detail always accompanying habit, is foreshadowed by his.  “I may safely affirm that, except the few ships that took refuge in Conquet, hardly a vessel of any kind has been able to enter or come out of Brest for four months,”—­ending October 10th.  “They have been obliged to unload near forty victuallers at Quimperley and carry their cargoes by land to Brest.  It must be the fault of the weather, not ours, if any of them escape.”

It was suitable indeed that so strenuous and admirable an exhibition of professional ability,—­of naval generalship,—­alike in strategic combination, tactical disposition, and administrative superintendence, should terminate in a brilliant triumph, at once its fruit and its crown; wherein sedulous and unremittent readiness for instant action, comprehended by few, received a startling demonstration which none could fail to understand.  As Nelson was pursued by ignorant sneers before the Nile, so Hawke was burned in effigy by the populace, at the very moment when laborious effort was about to issue in supreme achievement.  The victory in either case is less than the antecedent labor, as the crown, after all, is less than the work, the symbol than the fact symbolized.

A brief account of preceding conditions, and of the dispositions maintained to meet them, is therefore necessary to due appreciation of the victory of Quiberon Bay.  Although the diversions of 1758 had not very materially aided Frederic of Prussia, they had inflicted distinct humiliation and harassment upon France.  This, added to defeat upon the Continent and in North America, had convinced the French Government, as it convinced Napoleon a half-century later, that a determined blow must be struck at England herself as the operative centre upon which rested, and from which proceeded, the most serious detriment to their cause and that of their allies.  It was resolved, therefore, to attempt an invasion of England; to the threat of which the English people were always extremely sensitive.