that could only succeed as a surprise, executed with unhesitating rapidity.  Hawke himself was astounded at finding in Basque Roads, before Rochefort, “a safe spacious road in which all the navy of England, merchant ships included, may ride without the least annoyance.  Before I came here, the place was represented as very difficult of access, and so narrow that ships could not lie in safety from the forts—­nay, the pilots made many baulks before we came in.”  In fact, want of good pilotage summed up the fault of the expedition, from its inception in the Cabinet throughout all the antecedent steps of consultation and preparation.  Pitt’s impetuosity doubtless acted as a spur to laggards, but it was accompanied by a tendency to overbearing insolence that not infrequently browbeats cautious wisdom.  When applied to a man like Hawke, strong in natural temper and in conscious mastery of his profession, the tone characteristic of Pitt provokes an equally resolute self-assertion, as far removed from subjection as it is from insubordination; but friendship becomes impossible, and even co-operation difficult.

Throughout all Hawke kept his head, and made no serious mistake; but he accepts no unmerited censures.  Seeing that the transports are not enough for the healthful carriage of the troops, he so represents it.  The government, already impatient at any report of defects, hopes that things are now arranged to his satisfaction.  “I am astonished at this expression,” he says, “it is my duty to represent defects, but I am satisfied with any decision you make.”  Again, “I have received your letter signifying His Majesty’s directions to use the utmost diligence in embarking the troops and getting to sea.  As I cannot doubt my letter of Sunday being immediately communicated to you, I should have expected that before yours was sent His Majesty would have been fully satisfied that I needed no spur in executing his orders.”  As Hawke and Anson—­the First Lord—­were friends, there can be little doubt that we see here a firm protest against the much lauded tone to which the efficiency of the British army and navy under Pitt has been too exclusively attributed.  It was in the civil administration, the preparation that underlies military success, which being at home was under his own eye, that Pitt’s energy was beneficially felt, and also in his prompt recognition of fit instruments; but he had no need to discover Hawke or Boscawen.  He might as well be thought to have discovered the sun.

In discharging his part of the expedition Hawke’s course is consistent and clear.  It must in the first place be recognized that such enterprises are of secondary importance, and do not warrant the risks which are not only justifiable but imperative when a decisive issue is at stake.  Hawke’s heroic disregard of pilotage difficulties at Quiberon, in 1759, would have been culpable temerity at Basque Roads, in 1757.  But, save delays on this account, no