with the combined armies of France, Austria, and Russia.  Frederic’s activity made a heavy drain upon the troops and the treasure of France, preventing her by just so much from supporting her colonies and maintaining her fleet; but, heavily outnumbered as he was, it was desirable to work all possible diversion in his favor by attacks elsewhere.  This Pitt proposed to do by a series of descents upon the French coast, compelling the enemy to detach a large force from before the Prussian king to protect their own shores.

As far as the home naval force was concerned, the years 1757 and 1758 were dominated by this idea of diversion in favor of Frederic the Great.  From the general object of these enterprises, the army was necessarily the principal agent; but the navy was the indispensable auxiliary.  Hawke’s association with them is interesting chiefly as illustrative of professional character; for there was little or no room for achievement of naval results.  The first expedition in which he was concerned was that against Rochefort in 1757.  This, though now long forgotten, occasioned by its failure a storm of contemporary controversy.  Whatever chances of success it may under any circumstances have had were lost beforehand, owing to the lateness of the season—­June—­in which Pitt took office.  Preparation began at the moment when execution was due.  The troops which should have sailed in early summer could not, from delays apparently unavoidable under the conditions, get away before September 10.  Hawke himself hoisted his flag—­assumed active command—­only on August 15.  The previous administration was responsible for whatever defect in general readiness increased this delay; as regards the particular purpose, Pitt’s government was at fault in attempting at all an undertaking which, begun so late in the year, could not expect success under the notorious inadequacy of organization bequeathed to him by his predecessors.  But there will always be found at the beginning of a war, or upon a change of commanders, a restless impatience to do something, to make a showing of results, which misleads the judgment of those in authority, and commonly ends, if not in failure, at least in barren waste of powder and shot.

Not the least of the drawbacks under which the enterprise labored was extremely defective information—­especially hydrographic.  The character of the coast, the places suited for landing, the depths of water, and the channels, were practically unknown.  Hence a necessity for reconnoissances, pregnant of indefinite delay, as might have been foreseen.  Among Hawke’s memoranda occur the words, “Not to undertake anything without good pilots.”  The phrase is doubly significant, for he was not a man to worry needlessly about pilots, knowing that pilots look not to military results, but merely to their own responsibility not to take the ground; and it shows the total ignorance under which labored all who were charged with an undertaking