The French rear with its commander-in-chief had been watching the incidents narrated:  the crippling of the Intrepid, the consequent disorder in the British rear, and the increasing distance between it and the van.  When the Revenge, however, passed ahead, and Byng disentangled his flag-ship, the moment for a decisive step arrived.  The French rear vessels were nearer the British van than Byng’s division was.  They now filled their topsails, made more sail, stood for the British leading ships, already partially unrigged, passed by, and in so doing gave them the fire of a number of substantially fresh vessels, which had undergone only a distant and ineffective cannonade.  Byng saw what was about to happen, and also set more canvas; but it was no longer possible to retrieve the preceding errors.  The French admiral had it in his power very seriously to damage, if not to destroy the hostile van; but in accordance with the tradition of his nation he played an over-prudent game, strictly defensive, and kept too far off.  After exchanging distant broadsides, he steered northwest towards Mahon, satisfied that he had for the time disabled his opponent.  The British that evening tacked off-shore and stood to the southeast.  Four days later they abandoned the field, returning to Gibraltar.  The fall of Minorca followed.

Nothing could have been much worse than the deplorable management of this action on the part of the commander-in-chief.  It is a conspicuous instance of weak and halting execution, superimposed upon a professional conception radically erroneous; and it reflected throughout the timid hesitancy of spirit which dictated the return to Gibraltar, under the always doubtful sanction of a Council of War.  But the historical value of the lesson is diminished if attention is confined to the shortcomings of the admiral, neglectful of the fact that his views as to the necessity to observe the routine of the Fighting Instructions are reproduced in the evidence of the captains; and that the finding of the Court censures, not the general idea, but certain details, important yet secondary.  Durell, being asked whether the admiral could not have passed under the stern of the Trident, as the Trident had under that of the Louisa, replies, “Yes, but she would have been to leeward of those ships ahead;” that is, to leeward of the line.  Gardiner “knows no other method than what the admiral took, for preserving the line regular.”  Cornwall cannot pass the Intrepid without a signal, because it would be breaking the order.  These were all good men.