considered the most meritorious of his whole career,—­that of April 17, 1780.  The decisive signal given by him on that occasion, as explained by himself, meant that each ship should steer, not for the ship corresponding numerically to her in the enemy’s order, but for the one immediately opposite at the time the signal was made.  This is what Mathews and his seconds did, and others should have imitated.  Singularly enough, not only was the opportunity thus created lost, but there is no trace of its existence, even, being appreciated in such wise as to affect professional opinion.  As far as Mathews himself was concerned, the accounts show that his conduct, instead of indicating tactical sagacity, was a mere counsel of desperation.

But after engaging he committed palpable and even discreditable mistakes.  Hauling to windward—­away—­when the Marlborough forced him ahead, abandoned that ship to overwhelming numbers, and countenanced the irresolution of the Dorsetshire and others.  Continuing to stand north, after wearing on the evening of the battle, was virtually a retreat, unjustified by the conditions; and it would seem that the same false step gravely imperilled the Berwick, Hawke holding on, most properly, to the very last moment of safety, in order to get back his prize-crew.  Bringing-to on the night of the 23d was an error of the same character as standing north during that of the 22d.  It was the act of a doubtful, irresolute man,—­irresolute, not because a coward, but because wanting in the self-confidence that springs from conscious professional competency.  In short, the commander-in-chief’s unfitness was graphically portrayed in the conversation with Cornwall from the quarter gallery of the flag-ship.  “If you approve and will go down with me, I will go down.”  Like so many men, he needed a backer, to settle his doubts and to stiffen his backbone.  The instance is far from unique.

In the case of Byng, as of Mathews, we are not concerned with the general considerations of the campaign to which the battle was incidental.  It is sufficient to note that in Minorca, then a British possession, the French had landed an army of 15,000 men, with siege artillery sufficient to reduce the principal port and fortress, Port Mahon; upon which the whole island must fall.  Their communications with France depended upon the French fleet cruising in the neighborhood.  Serious injury inflicted upon it would therefore go far to relieve the invested garrison.

[Illustration:  Plan of Byng’s Action off Minorca, May 20, 1756]

[Transcriber’s Note:  This illustration shows on a map the positions of the fleets and their ships at various times in the action.  Critical positions on the map are marked with codes such as “B1” and “F2”, which will be referred to below in the text.  This illustration is available in the HTML version of the e-book.]