which is thought very feasible, we hope to frustrate by coming up with them before they reach the place of their destination.”  A week later, Nelson received off Sicily news of the surrender of Malta to the French.  In accordance with the views above expressed, Sir James now—­June 22d—­gave Nelson his written opinion, favoring the course adopted of seeking the enemy off the coast of Egypt; one of the most responsible decisions ever taken by an admiral in chief command, especially at the beginning of a career, as Nelson then was.  “We are now crowding sail for Alexandria; but it is very doubtful if we fall in with them at all, as we are proceeding on the merest conjecture, and not on any positive information.  If, at the end of our journey, we find we are upon the wrong scent, our embarrassment will be great indeed.  Fortunately, I only act here en second; but did the chief responsibility rest with me, I fear it would be more than my too irritable nerves would bear.”  Nelson, in truth, was passing these hours in a fever of anxiety, scarce able to eat or drink.  Yet at that very moment the British were crossing the enemy’s wake, unseeing and unseen, and barely fifty miles separated the two fleets.

The perplexity foreshadowed by Saumarez actually fell upon the English admiral, through his reaching Alexandria three days before the French.  Harassed out of his better judgment, he hurried back to the westward, touched at Sicily, and thence once more to Egypt.  Meantime, the French had landed successfully.  On the 1st of August the British fleet again sighted Alexandria; saw the French flag on the walls, but no ships of war.  “When the reconnoitring squadron made the signal that the enemy was not there,” wrote Saumarez, “despondency nearly took possession of my mind, and I do not remember ever to have felt so utterly hopeless or out of spirits as when we sat down to dinner.  Judge, then, what a change took place when, as the cloth was being removed, the officer of the watch hastily came in, saying, ’Sir, a signal is just now made that the enemy is in Aboukir Bay, and moored in a line of battle.’  All sprang from their seats, and, only staying to drink a bumper to our success, we were in a moment on deck.”  As the captain appeared, the crew hailed him with three hearty cheers, a significant token of the gloom which had wrapped the entire squadron through the recent ordeal of suspense and disappointment.

It is only with Saumarez’s share in this renowned battle that we are here concerned.  As is generally known, Nelson’s tactics consisted in doubling upon the van and centre of the enemy, who lay at anchor in a column head to wind, or nearly so.  Their rear, being to leeward, was thus thrown out of action.  The French had thirteen ships-of-the-line, of which one was of one hundred and twenty guns, and two eighties.  The British also had thirteen, all seventy-fours, and one of fifty guns; but one of the former going aground left them equal in numbers and inferior in