to Troubridge in the qualities necessary to chief command, in case of Nelson’s death, at a juncture which called for the highest abilities of a general officer.  The moment was too critical to permit mere favoritism to sway two such men against their judgment.  As it was, however, Nelson felt he could not part with so efficient a ship; and he therefore contented himself with giving Troubridge and Saumarez each a subdivision of four vessels, keeping six under his own immediate direction.

As all know, the French, when found, were at anchor.  Thus surprised, the British fleet was hurled at them in a single mass; nor was there any subordinate command exercised, by Saumarez or any other, except that of each captain over his particular ship.  Nelson’s first expectation was to overtake the unwieldy numbers of the enemy, amounting to over four hundred sail, at sea, and there to destroy both convoy and escort.  In such an encounter there would be inestimable tactical advantage in those compact subdivisions, which could be thrown as units, under a single head, in a required direction.  For such a charge Saumarez possessed most eminent capacity.

The warm family affection that was among the many winning traits of Saumarez’s symmetrical and attractive character impelled him to copious letter-writing.  Hence we have a record of this pursuit of the French fleet, with almost daily entries; an inside picture, reflecting the hopes, fears, and perplexities of the squadron.  Bonaparte’s enterprise has been freely condemned in later days as chimerical; but it did not so appear at the time to the gallant seamen who frustrated it.  The preparations had been so shrouded in mystery that neither Nelson nor his government had any certainty as to its destination,—­an ignorance shared by most of the prominent French officials.  When, after many surmises, the truth gradually transpired, the British officers realized that much time must yet elapse before the English ministry could know it.  Two months, for instance, passed before news of the Battle of the Nile reached London.  Then, if India were the ultimate object, to which Egypt was but the stepping-stone, four months more, at least, would be needed to get a naval reinforcement to the threatened point.  What if, meanwhile, the ally of France in the peninsula, Tippoo Saib, had been assembling transports with the secrecy observed at Toulon and the other ports whence the divisions had sailed?  “I dined with Sir Horatio to-day,” writes Saumarez on June 15th, nearly four weeks after Bonaparte’s starting, “and find that his intelligence extends only to the enemy’s fleet having been seen off Sicily; but we have reason to suppose them gone for Alexandria, the distance from which to the Red Sea is only three days’ journey.  They may soon be transported thence by water to the East Indies, with the assistance of Tippoo Saib; and with their numerous army they expect to drive us out of our possessions in India.  This profound scheme,