side began to form in order of battle between the enemy and their own convoy.  The lists being thus cleared and the lines ranged, the British vessels, which were to windward, stood down together, after what was then the time-honored and unintelligent practice of their service, each to attack one of the Dutch; disdaining to attempt doubling upon any part of the hostile line.  Their ideal appears to have been that of the tournament, where every advantage of numbers and combination was rejected in order to insure that the test should be that of individual courage and skill.  So strong was this tradition in the British navy that its ablest contemporary chronicler, James, has sought to explain away, half apologetically, the advantage gained by Nelson in doubling on the French van at the Nile.

The Dutch, equally quixotic, refrained from taking advantage of the enemy’s inability to use his broadsides while thus approaching nearly head-on.  Arrayed in a close column, the ships about six hundred feet apart, the crews at the guns, and the marines drawn up on the poops, they waited in silence until the English, at 8 A.M., were in position at half musket shot.  Then the battle-flag was hoisted by each admiral, and all opened together, the conflict raging with fury for nearly four hours.  It was the first time since the days of the great De Ruyter, more than a century before, that these kindred people had thus met in fair fight upon the sea.  Equal in courage and in seamanship, and each neglecting to seek a tactical advantage, the usual result followed.  Many men were killed and wounded, no ship was taken, and the combatants separated after a drawn battle; but as one Dutch ship sank the next day, and their convoy could not proceed, the British claimed a victory.  Their own merchant vessels, being on the return voyage, were able to complete it.

Saumarez had shown his usual gallantry, and was again promoted.  On the 23d of August, eighteen days after the action, he was made commander into the Tisiphone, a small but fast cruiser, technically called a fire-ship, and attached to the Channel fleet.  In December, the British government learned that a large number of transports and supply ships were about to sail from Brest for the West Indies.  These were to carry troops and stores to the fleet of Count De Grasse, who had returned to Martinique after the surrender at Yorktown, and was now about to undertake the conquest of Jamaica.  It was imperative to intercept an expedition so essential to the success of the French plan, and Admiral Kempenfelt—­the same who afterwards, in the Royal George, “went down with twice four hundred men”—­was sent in pursuit with twelve ships-of-the-line.  The Tisiphone accompanied them as lookout vessel, and on the 12th of December, 1781, being then well ahead of the fleet, she was able to signal the admiral that the enemy was in sight to leeward with seventeen of-the-line; but that the latter, instead of being