occasions of revolt.  “Our great reliance,” he said,—­not directly in reference to the blockade, but to the general thought of which the blockade, as instituted by him, was the most illustrious exemplification,—­“is on the vigilance and activity of our cruisers at sea, any reduction in the number of which, by applying them to guard our ports, inlets, and beaches, would in my judgment tend to our destruction.”  Amplified as the idea was by him, when head of the Admiralty, to cover not only Brest but all ports where hostile divisions lay, it became a strategic plan of wide sweep, which crushed the vitality of the hostile navies, isolated France from all support by commerce, and fatally sapped her strength.  To St. Vincent, more than to any one man, is due the effective enforcement and maintenance of this system; and in this sense, as practically the originator of a decisive method, he is fairly and fully entitled to be considered the organizer of ultimate victory.

The local dispositions before Brest will not here be analyzed.[14] Suffice it to say that, as revealed in Jervis’s correspondence, they show that equipment of general professional knowledge, that careful study of conditions,—­of what corresponds to “the ground” of a shore battle-field,—­and the thoughtful prevision of possibilities, which constitute so far the skilful tactician.  The defence and the attack of seaports, embracing as they do both occupation of permanent positions and the action of mobile bodies, are tactical questions; differing much, yet not radically, from field operations, where positions are taken incidentally, but where movement of armed men is the principal factor.  In the one sense St. Vincent displayed a high degree of aptitude for ordered permanent dispositions, which is the side of tactics most akin to strategy.  On the more distinctively tactical side, in the movements of a fleet in action, he had little opportunity.  As far as shown by his one battle, Cape St. Vincent, it would not appear that either by nature or cultivation he possessed to any great extent the keen insight and quick appreciation that constitute high tactical ability.

Earl St. Vincent rendered three great services to England.  The first was the forming and disciplining the Mediterranean fleet into the perfection that has been mentioned.  Into it, thus organized, he breathed a spirit which, taking its rise from the stern commander himself, rested upon a conviction of power, amply justified in the sequel by Cape St. Vincent and the Nile, its two greatest achievements.  The second was the winning of the Battle of St. Vincent at a most critical political moment.  The third was the suppression of mutiny in 1797 and 1798.  But, in estimating the man, these great works are not to be considered as isolated from his past and his future.  They were the outcome and fruitage of a character naturally strong, developed through long years of patient sustained devotion to the ideals of discipline and