and more especially after the messages brought him, he could not, without breach of duty, either have chased or sent ships to chase out of the line.”  It is to be noted that the word “chase” is here used in the strictest technical sense, not merely to exclude Lestock from diverting a ship to some other purpose than that of the engagement, but even from shifting her place in the general order in the view of furthering the engagement; for the Court says again:  “The Vice-Admiral could not send any ships of his division to the relief of the Namur and Marlborough without breaking the order of battle, there being four ships of the Admiral’s division” (to wit, the Dorsetshire and that crowd) “stationed between the Vice-Admiral’s division and the Marlborough, which four ships might have gone to the assistance of the Marlborough.”

The second in command thus had no liberty to repair either the oversights of his superior, or the results of obvious bad conduct in juniors; for Burrish’s backwardness was observed throughout the rear.  There was a long road yet to travel to Nelson’s personal action at St. Vincent and Copenhagen, or to his judicious order at Trafalgar, “The Second in command will, after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his line.”  Even that great officer Hood, off the Chesapeake in 1781, felt himself tied hand and foot by the union flag at the mizzen peak,—­the signal for the line.  Only the commander-in-chief could loose the bonds; either by his personal initiative alone, and vigilant supervision, as did Hawke and Rodney, or by adding to this the broad view of discretion in subordinates which Nelson took.  Before leaving this subject, note may be taken of a pettifogging argument advanced by Lestock and adopted by the Court, that orders to these three ships to press ahead would have resulted in nothing, because of the lightness of the wind then and afterwards.  True, doubtless, and known after the fact; but who before the event could predict the uncertain Mediterranean breeze, or how much each foot gained might contribute to the five minutes which measure the interval between victory and defeat.  It is not by such lagging hesitations that battles are won.

It is a trivial coincidence, though it may be noted in passing, that as it was the second astern of the commander-in-chief on whom fell the weight of the disgrace, so it was the second astern of the commander of the van who alone scored a distinct success, and achieved substantial gain of professional reputation.  Hawke, at first bearing down, had come to close action with the Spanish Neptuno, a vessel nominally of less force than his own ship, the Berwick.  The Neptuno was at length driven out of her line, with a loss of some two hundred killed and wounded.  Thus left without an immediate antagonist, Hawke’s attention was attracted by another Spanish vessel, the Poder, of the same nominal force as the