on to seek other unbeaten foes, he left the field again clear for Nelson, the latter, by a movement of the helm, grappled the San Nicolas.  Incredible as it may appear, the crew of this one British seventy-four carried, sword in hand, both the enemy’s ships, though of far superior force.  “Extravagant as the story may seem,” wrote Nelson, “on the quarter-deck of a Spanish first-rate I received the swords of the vanquished Spaniards, which, as I received, I gave to William Fearney, one of my bargemen, who placed them with the greatest sang-froid under his arm.”

Four Spanish ships, two of them of the largest size, were the trophies of this victory; but its moral effect in demonstrating the relative values of the two navies, and the confidence England could put in men like Jervis, Nelson, and the leading captains, was far greater.  The spirit of the nation, depressed by a long series of reverses, revived like a giant refreshed with wine.  Jervis had spoken truth when he said a victory was essential to England at that time.  The gratitude of the state was shown in the profusion of rewards showered upon the victors.  Promotions and honors were liberally distributed.  The Government had already purposed to recognize Jervis’s previous services by raising him to the lower ranks of the peerage; but this timely triumph procured him at one step a higher elevation.  He was created Earl of St. Vincent, with a pension of three thousand pounds per annum.

The tactical decisions made by Jervis on this momentous occasion were correct as far as they went; but, except the initial determination to attack the larger body of the enemy, because to windward, there is no evidence of tactical originality in him, no innovation comparable to Howe’s manoeuvres on May 28 and 29,—­and there was undoubted oversight in not providing by signal against that move of the weather Spanish division which it became Nelson’s opportunity and glory to counteract.  It is also possible that the signal to tack in succession, a wholly routine proceeding, might have been made earlier to advantage; but the writer does not think that the body of the fleet should then have tacked together, as some criticism would have it.  Until the British van approached on the new tack, the broadsides of the centre were better ranged on the original line to counteract the efforts, actually made, by the lee Spanish division to break through.  As regards the decision not to follow the victory further, which has been censured in the instances of Rodney and Howe, the conditions here differed in much.  The disparity of numbers was very great; if many of the enemy had suffered greatly, many also had not suffered at all; they were now reunited; above all Jervis’s strategic and political insight—­far superior to his tactical equipment—­had rightly read the situation when he said that what England needed was a victory,—­moral effect.  The victory was there, undeniable and brilliant, it was better not risked.