of mind.  On the morning of St. Vincent he was overheard to mutter, “A victory is very necessary to England at this time.”  The present odds to his own fleet, twenty-seven against fifteen, disappeared in the larger needs of the country.  Again, when wrestling with the perplexities and exigencies of the wild Brest blockade in midwinter, in January, 1801, he wrote concerning repairs to his own vessels, “Under the present impending storm from the north of Europe, and the necessity there is of equipping every ship in the royal ports that can swim, no ship under my command must have anything done to her at Plymouth or Portsmouth that can be done at this anchorage,”—­at Torbay, an open though partially sheltered roadstead.  Here again is seen the subordination of the particular and personal care to the broad considerations of a great strategic emergency.

The series of diversions upon the French coast in which Howe was employed during 1758, terminated with that season, and he returned to his own ship, the Magnanime, rejoining with her the main fleet under Hawke in the great Brest blockade of 1759.  The French Government, after four years of disaster upon the continent, of naval humiliation, and of loss of maritime and colonial power, had now realized that its worst evils and chief danger sprang from the sea power of Great Britain, and, like Napoleon a half-century later, determined to attempt an invasion.  Its preparations and Hawke’s dispositions to counteract them, have been described in the life of that admiral, as have Rodney’s bombardment of Havre and interception of coastwise communications; all directed to the same general end of confounding designs against England, but no longer as mere diversions in favor of Frederick.  Howe was still a private captain, but he bore a characteristically conspicuous part in the stormy final scene at Quiberon, when Hawke drove Conflans before him to utter confusion.  When the French fleet was sighted, the Magnanime had been sent ahead to make the land.  She was thus in the lead in the headlong chase which ensued, and was among the first in action; at 3 P.M., by Howe’s journal, the firing having begun at 2.30, according to Hawke’s despatch.  The foreyard being soon shot away, the consequent loss of manoeuvring power impeded her captain’s designs in placing her, but she remained closely engaged throughout, compelling one French vessel to strike and anchor alongside her.  The bad weather prevented taking possession that night of the prize, which, in consequence, availed herself of her liberty by running ashore, and so was lost to her captors.  The Magnanime was reported as having thirteen killed and sixty-six wounded, out of a total of hurt not much exceeding three hundred in the entire fleet.  The casualty list proves exposure to fire, doubtless; but is no sure test of the effectiveness of a vessel’s action.  The certainty of Howe’s conduct in this affair, otherwise imperfectly described, rests on a broader and firmer basis of reputation, won by unvarying efficiency in many differing capacities and circumstances.