In the chain of eminent typical names which leads up to that of Nelson, there will be found between Howe and his next conspicuous successor,—­conspicuous, that is, not only by merit, as was Hood, but by achievement, which was denied to Hood,—­between Howe and Jervis, just that difference which essentially separates the tactician from the strategist:  the lifting of the eye from the moves of the game immediately before one, to glance over the whole board, to view the wider field, and from its possibilities to form conceptions directive of immediate action for distant ends.  In both these distinguished general officers,—­for such both were,—­there is seen a similar close attention to details, based upon and guided by an acquaintance with their profession profound as well as extensive, minute as well as general; in both the same diligence and iron equanimity in difficult situations, although in Jervis the impression received is rather that of a burden borne with resolute fortitude, whereas in Howe the burden is thrown off by a placid, unforeboding temper; but in the adoption of measures, those of Howe will be found generally not to extend beyond the situation immediately before him, by which they are dictated, whereas Jervis seeks to bend circumstances to his will, according to a conception he has formed of what the situation ought to be, and can be forced to become.

The idiosyncrasy of either officer is emphasized in their respective plans of campaign, while commanding the Channel Fleet during the French Revolution.  Howe will maintain a certain station in port, keeping his fleet there in hand, well conditioned, and as far as may be well drilled; then, when the French do something, he also will do something to counteract them.  Jervis, on the contrary, confronting substantially the same conditions, frames his measures with a view to prevent the enemy from doing anything, and all the details of his plan rest upon this one idea, to the fulfilment of which they contribute.  He puts the fleet at once into the position of action, instead of that of awaiting, as Howe does.  Both are charged with the same duty,—­the defence of Great Britain,—­and by the same Government, which evidently in each case frames its instructions upon the ascertained views of the eminent officer intrusted with the work.  To carry out this defensive campaign, Howe of his own choice narrows his strategic plan to the sheer defensive, which follows the initiative of the enemy; Jervis of set purpose seeks the same object by offensive dispositions, by which the enemy is to be forced to regulate his movements.  Howe sees the defence of the empire in the preservation of his own fleet; Jervis in the destruction of the enemy.  The one view is local, narrow, and negative; the other general, broad, and positive.  As often happens—­and very naturally—­Jervis’s preoccupation with considerations wider than his own command found expression, twice at least, in phrases which pithily summed up his steadfast enduring habit