A truer explanation of this grave negligence is to be found in Rodney’s more casual words recorded by Hood.  “I lamented to Sir George on the twelfth that the signal for a general chase was not made when that for the line was hauled down, and that he did not continue to pursue so as to keep sight of the enemy all night; to which he only answered, ’Come, we have done very handsomely as it is.’  I could therefore say no more upon the subject.”  He did, however, resume the subject with Sir Charles Douglas, the chief of staff.  Douglas was of the same opinion as Hood, and for making the suggestion at the proper moment had been snubbed by Rodney, who had established over him a domination of manner which precluded proper insistence, or even due representation, such as became his office.  “His answer was, ‘Sir George chose to pursue in a body;’” that is, in regular order, not by general chase. “‘Why, Sir Charles,’ I replied, ’if that was Sir George’s wish, could it have been more effectually complied with than by the signal for a general chase, with proper attention?  Because, if a ship is too wide on the starboard wing, you have a signal to make her steer more to port.  If a ship is too wide on the larboard wing, you have a signal to make her steer more to starboard.  If a ship is too far ahead, you can by signal make her shorten sail,’” etc.  This by daylight; while, “’if Sir George was unwilling his ships should engage in the night, there is a signal to call every ship in, and, that followed by the one for the form of sailing, the fleet might have gone on in sight of the enemy all night in the most compact and safe order for completing the business most gloriously the next day.’  Sir Charles walked off without saying another word.”  There was in fact nothing to say.  Hood’s methods were not only correct, but in no respect novel.  Every capable officer was familiar with them before, as well as after the battle.  The trouble was that Rodney was content with a present clear success, and averse from further risk.  He had reached his limitations.  It is known now that Douglas agreed with Hood, but he was too loyal to his chief to say so publicly, then or afterwards; and especially, doubtless, to so irritable a talker.

As illustrative of Rodney’s professional character the events of April 8th to 12th are therefore unfavorable rather than the reverse.  Concerning his stronger qualities their evidence is simply cumulative; the new light thrown reveals defects, not unsuspected excellencies.  The readiness in which his fleet was held at Santa Lucia, the promptness with which he followed, the general conduct of the chase as far as appears, though doubtless open to criticism in detail as in the ever censorious remarks of Hood,—­all these show the same alert, accomplished, and diligent officer, resolute to the utmost of his natural and acquired faculties.  It is the same after the battle joins, so long as its progress does not transcend his accepted ideas,—­which were much in advance of the great mass of his contemporaries,—­though under the conditions he saw no chance to apply the particular methods familiar to his thought.