Of the reasons for such lethargic action, wholly inconsistent with true military principle, and bitterly criticised by Hood,—­who affirmed that twenty ships might have been taken,—­Rodney drew up an express account, which cannot be considered as adequate to his justification.  In this he argued that, if he had pursued, the enemy, who “went off in a close connected body, might have defeated by rotation the ships that had come up with them, and thereby exposed the British fleet, after a victory, to a defeat.”  “They went off in a body of twenty-six ships-of-the-line, and might, by ordering two or three of their best-sailing ships or frigates to have shown lights at times, and by changing their course, have induced the British fleet to have followed them, while the main of their fleet, by hiding their lights, might have hauled their wind, have been far to windward before daylight, and intercepted the captured ships, and the most crippled ships of the English;” and he even conceived that, as the main body of the British would at the same time have gone far to leeward, the French, regaining their own ports in Guadaloupe and Martinique, might have taken Antigua, Barbados, and Santa Lucia.

The principal impression produced by this formal summary of reasons is that of unwisdom after the event, and that it was elicited by the remonstrances of Hood to himself, which are known to have voiced discontent prevalent in the fleet, and rendered some ready reply expedient.  The substance of them, when analyzed, is that war must be rendered effective by not running risks, and that calculation to that effect is to be made by attributing every chance and advantage to the enemy, and none to one’s self.  Further, no account is to be taken of that most notable factor, ultimate risk,—­as distinguished from present risk.  This phantasm, of the sudden assumption of the offensive by a beaten and disordered fleet, which, through the capture of its chief, had changed commanders at nightfall, is as purely and mischievously imaginative as the fiction, upon which it rests, of the close connected body.  Instead of being close-connected, the French were scattered hopelessly, utterly disabled for immediate, or even proximate, resistance to a well sustained chase and attack.  During the next twenty-four hours their new admiral had with him but ten ships; and only five joined in the following twelve days, to April 25th, when he reached Cap Francois, where four more were found.  Six others had strayed to Curacao, six hundred miles distant, whence they did not rejoin the flag until May.  Neither in Rodney’s surmises, nor in the actual facts of the case, is to be found any reasonable excuse for failure to observe the evident military duty of keeping touch with the enemy during the dark hours,—­“pursue under easy sail,” to use Hood’s words, “so as never to have lost sight of the enemy in the night,”—­with a view to resume the engagement next day, at farthest.  This, and to regain to windward, were as feasible to the victor as to the vanquished.