regardless of order, was to obey the letter rather than the spirit.  Muddle-headed as Mathews seems to have been, what he was trying to do was clear enough; and the duty of a subordinate was to carry out his evident aim.  An order does not necessarily supersede its predecessor, unless the two are incompatible.  The whole incident, from Lestock’s act to the Court’s finding, is instructive as showing the slavish submission to the letter of the Instructions; a submission traceable not to the law merely, but to the added tradition that had then fast hold of men’s minds.  It is most interesting to note that the unfortunate Byng was one of the signers of this opinion, as he was also one of the judges that sentenced Mathews to be dismissed from the navy, as responsible for the general failure.

During the night of the 21st the allies, who had stopped after dark, appear again to have made sail.  Consequently, when day broke, the British found themselves some distance astern and to windward—­ northeast; the wind continuing easterly.  Their line, indifferently well formed in van and centre, stretched over a length of nine miles through the straggling of the rear.  Lestock’s ship was six miles from that of Mathews, whereas it should not have been more than two and a half, at most, in ordinary sailing; for battle, the Instructions allowed little over a half-mile.  Accepting the Court’s finding that he was in position at dark, this distance can only be attributed, as Lestock argued and the Court admitted, to a current—­that most convenient of scape-goats in navigation.  The allies, too, had a lagging rear body, five Spanish ships being quite a distance astern; but from van to rear they extended but six miles, against the British nine.  It was the distance of the British rear, not straggling in van or centre, that constituted this disadvantage.

Mathews wished to wait till Lestock reached his place, but the allies were receding all the time; and, though their pace was slackened to enable the five sternmost Spaniards to come up, the space between the fleets was increasing.  It was the duty of the British admiral to force an action, on general principles; but in addition he believed that the French intended to push for Gibraltar, enter the Atlantic, and join their Brest fleet, in order to cover an invasion of England by an army reported to be assembling at Dunkirk.  Clearly, therefore, something must be done; yet to enter into a general engagement with near a third of his command out of immediate supporting distance was contrary to the accepted principles of the day.  The fleet was not extended with that of the enemy, by which is meant that the respective vans, centres, and rears were not opposed; the British van being only abreast of the allied centre, their centre of the allied rear, Lestock tailing away astern and to windward, while the dozen leading French were some distance ahead of both bodies.  Now the Fighting Instructions required that, “If the admiral and his fleet have the wind of the enemy, and they have stretched themselves in a line of battle, the van of the admiral’s fleet is to steer with the van of the enemies, and there to engage them.”  There was no alternative course laid down; just as there was no punishment alternative to death in the Article of War under which Byng was shot.