Hood with eight ships-of-the-line and a large convoy arrived on the station in January, 1781, and was at St. Eustatius with the commander-in-chief when Rodney received a report, which proved to be false, that eight to ten French ships-of-the-line, with a numerous supply-fleet, had been sighted in European waters evidently bound for the West Indies.  He thereupon detached Hood, on February 12th, and directed him with seventeen of-the-line to await the enemy to windward of Martinique, their probable destination.  A month later he ordered the position to be shifted to leeward of the island, in front of the French arsenal port, Fort Royal.  Hood dissented from this, remonstrating vigorously, and the event proved him right; but Rodney insisted, the more injudiciously in that he was throwing the tactical burden upon his junior while fettering thus his tactical discretion.  Meantime, twenty French ships-of-the-line did sail on March 22d for Martinique, under Count De Grasse:  beginning then the campaign which ended in the great disaster of April 12, 1782, but not until it had been signalized by the surrender of Cornwallis, due to this fleet, as Washington said.  On the 28th of April it came in sight of Hood; but, owing to the leewardly position insisted upon by Rodney, the English commander could not prevent the junction to it of four French ships then in the port.  A battle followed next day, of eighteen British—­one having just joined—­against twenty-four enemies; odds which, combined with the weather gage held by the French, should have insured them a decisive victory.  This result was prevented by the tentative action of De Grasse, encountering the tactical capacity and imperturbable self-possession of Hood.

Rodney could not have bettered Hood’s management, though he of course attributed to him the blame for results.  It is evident, however, that for various reasons the commander-in-chief should have been with the body of his fleet.  Even barring certain and timely information of the French coming, which Hood at least did not have, there was every reasonable probability that such an expedition would arrive at about the season it did.  Hood’s insight, which was adequate to divining possibilities as well as to dealing with ascertained conditions, had taught him that the latter half of April—­and not sooner—­was the time by which the British should be refitted, provisioned and watered full, and in all respects ready for prolonged operations against a powerful enemy; as well as concentrated to windward.  He reasoned thus from the fact that the French navy, to the number of forty odd,—­being the combined fleets of D’Estaing from Brest and De Guichen from the West Indies,—­had been assembled in Cadiz towards the end of 1780, and did not return to Brest until January, 1781.  To refit, sail, and reach Martinique again, would in his judgment postpone arrival to the middle of April, and this respite should be improved by getting the British ships into the best campaigning condition,