1.  That the Censors had judicial power.

2.  That being judges of the matter, what they had adjudged was not traversable.  That the plaintiff could not be permitted to gainsay, what the Censors had said by their judgment—­that the medicines were noxious.

3.  Though the medicines were really good, yet no action lies against the Censors, because it is a wrong judgment in a matter within the limits of their jurisdiction; and a judge is not answerable, either to the King or the party, for the mistakes or errors of his judgment in a matter of which he has jurisdiction; It would expose the justice of the nation, and no man would execute the office upon peril of being arraigned by action or indictment for every judgment he pronounces.

All that I have quoted from the English cases and our own to show that malice must be proven to make out the offense, is expressly contained in the statute under which this indictment is framed.  The words are (Sec. 19) “shall knowingly and wilfully receive the vote of any person not entitled to vote.” (And Section 20 as amended) “If any such officer shall knowingly and wilfully register, as a voter any person not entitled to vote.”

And wilfully means, to use the language of Mr. Justice Wilson, “contrary to a man’s own conviction.”

If it be said that the defendants must be presumed to know the law, that is answered above by the quotations from the opinion of Mr. Justice Wilson.

Besides when the statute speaks of “knowledge,” aside from the expression “wilfully” it means knowledge as a fact—­not any forced presumption of knowledge against the clear facts of the case.

To this extent and to this extent only, does the presumption that defendants were bound to know the law go, viz:  They were bound to know that if they as a fact “knowingly and wilfully registered as a voter any person not entitled to be registered” or “knowingly and wilfully received the vote of any person not entitled to vote,” in either case they were liable to the penalty; and they could not be allowed to urge in their defense any ignorance that the law made those facts criminal.

Here is a total absence of any pretence of malice.  The defendants acted honestly and according to their best judgment.  This is conceded.  The most that can be said against them is, that they have erred in judgment.  They are not lawyers, nor skilled in the law.  They had presented to them a legal question which, to say the least, has puzzled some of the ablest legal minds of the nation.  The penalty is the same, on which ever side they err.  If they can be convicted of crime, a test must be imposed upon them, which no judge in the land could stand.

The defendants should be discharged by this Court.

Mr. Crowley then rose to make his argument, when the Court said: