to settle a principle in her own person.  She takes the risk, and she cannot escape the consequences.  It is said, and authorities are cited to sustain the position, that there can be no crime unless there is a culpable intent; to render one criminally responsible a vicious will must be present.  A commits a trespass on the land of B, and B, thinking and believing that he has a right to shoot an intruder on his premises, kills A on the spot.  Does B’s misapprehension of his rights justify his act?  Would a Judge be justified in charging the jury that if satisfied that B supposed he had a right to shoot A he was justified, and they should find a verdict of not guilty?  No Judge would make such a charge.  To constitute a crime, it is true, that there must be a criminal intent, but it is equally true that knowledge of the facts of the case is always held to supply this intent.  An intentional killing bears with it evidence of malice in law.  Whoever, without justifiable cause, intentionally kills his neighbor, is guilty of a crime.  The principle is the same in the case before us, and in all criminal cases.  The precise question now before me has been several times decided, viz.:  that one illegally voting was bound and was assumed to know the law, and that a belief that he had a right to vote gave no defense, if there was no mistake of fact. (Hamilton against The People, 57th of Barbour, p. 625; State against Boyet, 10th of Iredell, p. 336; State against Hart, 6th Jones, 389; McGuire against State, 7 Humphrey, 54; 15th of Iowa reports, 404.) No system of criminal jurisprudence can be sustained upon any other principle.  Assuming that Miss Anthony believed she had a right to vote, that fact constitutes no defense if in truth she had not the right.  She voluntarily gave a vote which was illegal, and thus is subject to the penalty of the law.

Upon this evidence I suppose there is no question for the jury and that the jury should be directed to find a verdict of guilty.

JUDGE SELDEN:  I submit that on the view which your Honor has taken, that the right to vote and the regulation of it is solely a State matter.  That this whole law is out of the jurisdiction of the United States Courts and of Congress.  The whole law upon that basis, as I understand it, is not within the constitutional power of the general Government, but is one which applies to the States.  I suppose that it is for the jury to determine whether the defendant is guilty of a crime or not.  And I therefore ask your Honor to submit to the jury these propositions: 

First—­If the defendant, at the time of voting, believed that she had a right to vote and voted in good faith in that belief, she is not guilty of the offense charged.

Second—­In determining the question whether she did or did not believe that she had a right to vote, the jury may take into consideration, as bearing upon that question, the advice which she received from the counsel to whom she applied.