say, that the franchise of voting shall be limited to the male sex.  In saying this, there is, in my judgment, no violation of the letter or of the spirit of the 14th or of the 15th Amendment.  This view is assumed in the second section of the 14th Amendment, which enacts that if the right to vote for Federal officers is denied by any state to any of the male inhabitants of such State, except for crime, the basis of representation of such State shall be reduced in proportion specified.  Not only does this section assume that the right of male inhabitants to vote was the especial object of its protection, but it assumes and admits the right of a State, notwithstanding the existence of that clause under which the defendant claims to the contrary, to deny to classes or portions of the male inhabitants the right to vote which is allowed to other male inhabitants.  The regulation of the suffrage is thereby conceded to the States as a State’s right.  The case of Myra Bradwell, decided at a recent term of the Supreme Court of the United States, sustains both the positions above put forth, viz:  First, that the rights referred to in the 14th Amendment are those belonging to a person as a citizen of the United States and not as a citizen of a State, and second, that a right of the character here involved is not one connected with citizenship of the United States.  Mrs. Bradwell made application to be admitted to practice as an attorney and counsellor at law, in the Courts of Illinois.  Her application was denied, and upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, it was there held that to give jurisdiction under the 14th Amendment, the claim must be of a right pertaining to citizenship of the United States, and that the claim made by her did not come within that class of cases.  Mr. Justice Bradley and Mr. Justice Field held that a woman was not entitled to a license to practice law.  It does not appear that the other Judges passed upon that question.

The 14th Amendment gives no right to a woman to vote, and the voting by Miss Anthony was in violation of the law.

If she believed she had a right to vote, and voted in reliance upon that belief, does that relieve her from the penalty?  It is argued that the knowledge referred to in the act relates to her knowledge of the illegality of the act, and not to the act of voting; for it is said that she must know that she voted.  Two principles apply here:  First, ignorance of the law excuses no one; second, every person is presumed to understand and to intend the necessary effects of his own acts.  Miss Anthony knew that she was a woman, and that the constitution of this State prohibits her from voting.  She intended to violate that provision—­intended to test it, perhaps, but certainly intended to violate it.  The necessary effect of her act was to violate it, and this she is presumed to have intended.  There was no ignorance of any fact, but all the facts being known, she undertook