It does not appear who this John Wachter was, nor by what accident he came to have so distinguished a critic.  If we may judge by the extracts at present before us, he seems to have been an absurd and extravagant person, who had attempted to combine the theology of the Cabbala with the very little which he was able to understand of the philosophy of Spinoza; and, as far as he is concerned, neither his writings nor the reflections upon them are of interest to any human being.  The extravagance of Spinoza’s followers, however, furnished Leibnitz with an opportunity of noticing the points on which he most disapproved of Spinoza himself; and these few notices M. de Caroil has now for the first time published as “The Refutation of Spinoza. by Leibnitz.”  They are exceedingly brief and scanty; and the writer of them would assuredly have hesitated to describe an imperfect criticism by so ambitious a title.  The modern editor, however, must be allowed the privilege of a worshipper, and we will not quarrel with him for an exaggerated estimate of what his master had accomplished.  We are indebted to his enthusiasm for what is at least a curious discovery, and we will not qualify the gratitude which he has earned by industry and good will.  At the same time, the notes themselves confirm the opinion which we have always entertained, that Leibnitz did not understand Spinoza.  Leibnitz did not understand him, and the followers of Leibnitz do not understand him now.  If he were no more than what he is described in the book before us.—­if his metaphysics were “miserable,” if his philosophy was absurd, and he himself nothing more than a second-rate disciple of Descartes,—­we can assure M. de Caroil that we should long ago have heard the last of him.

There must be something else, something very different from this, to explain the position which he holds in Germany, or the fascination which his writings exerted over such minds as those of Lessing or of Goethe; and the fact of so enduring an influence is more than a sufficient answer to mere depreciating criticism.  This. however, is not a point which there is any use in pressing.  Our present business is to justify the two assertions which we have made.  First, that Leibnitz conceived his “Theory of the Harmonic Pre-etablie” from Spinoza, without acknowledgment; and, secondly, that this theory is quite as inconsistent with religion as is that of Spinoza, and only differs from it in disguising its real character.

First for the “Harmonic Pre-etablie.”  Spinoza’s “Ethics” appeared in 1677; and we know that they were read by Leibnitz.  In 1696, Leibnitz announced as a discovery of his own, a Theory of “The Communication of Substances,” which he illustrates in the following manner:—­