391

Conversation.—­Great words:  Religion, I deny it.

Conversation.—­Scepticism helps religion.

392

Against Scepticism.—­[...  It is, then, a strange fact that we cannot define these things without obscuring them, while we speak of them with all assurance.] We assume that all conceive of them in the same way; but we assume it quite gratuitously, for we have no proof of it.  I see, in truth, that the same words are applied on the same occasions, and that every time two men see a body change its place, they both express their view of this same fact by the same word, both saying that it has moved; and from this conformity of application we derive a strong conviction of a conformity of ideas.  But this is not absolutely or finally convincing, though there is enough to support a bet on the affirmative, since we know that we often draw the same conclusions from different premisses.

This is enough, at least, to obscure the matter; not that it completely extinguishes the natural light which assures us of these things.  The academicians[153] would have won.  But this dulls it, and troubles the dogmatists to the glory of the sceptical crowd, which consists in this doubtful ambiguity, and in a certain doubtful dimness from which our doubts cannot take away all the clearness, nor our own natural lights chase away all the darkness.

393

It is a singular thing to consider that there are people in the world who, having renounced all the laws of God and nature, have made laws for themselves which they strictly obey, as, for instance, the soldiers of Mahomet, robbers, heretics, etc.  It is the same with logicians.  It seems that their licence must be without any limits or barriers, since they have broken through so many that are so just and sacred.

394

All the principles of sceptics, stoics, atheists, etc., are true.  But their conclusions are false, because the opposite principles are also true.

395

Instinct, reason.—­We have an incapacity of proof, insurmountable by all dogmatism.  We have an idea of truth, invincible to all scepticism.

396

Two things instruct man about his whole nature; instinct and experience.

397

The greatness of man is great in that he knows himself to be miserable.  A tree does not know itself to be miserable.  It is then being miserable to know oneself to be miserable; but it is also being great to know that one is miserable.

398

All these same miseries prove man’s greatness.  They are the miseries of a great lord, of a deposed king.

399

We are not miserable without feeling it.  A ruined house is not miserable.  Man only is miserable. Ego vir videns.[154]

400

The greatness of man.—­We have so great an idea of the soul of man that we cannot endure being despised, or not being esteemed by any soul; and all the happiness of men consists in this esteem.