327

The world is a good judge of things, for it is in natural ignorance, which is man’s true state.[124] The sciences have two extremes which meet.  The first is the pure natural ignorance in which all men find themselves at birth.  The other extreme is that reached by great intellects, who, having run through all that men can know, find they know nothing, and come back again to that same ignorance from which they set out; but this is a learned ignorance which is conscious of itself.  Those between the two, who have departed from natural ignorance and not been able to reach the other, have some smattering of this vain knowledge, and pretend to be wise.  These trouble the world, and are bad judges of everything.  The people and the wise constitute the world; these despise it, and are despised.  They judge badly of everything, and the world judges rightly of them.

328

The reason of effects.—­Continual alternation of pro and con.

We have then shown that man is foolish, by the estimation he makes of things which are not essential; and all these opinions are destroyed.  We have next shown that all these opinions are very sound, and that thus, since all these vanities are well founded, the people are not so foolish as is said.  And so we have destroyed the opinion which destroyed that of the people.

But we must now destroy this last proposition, and show that it remains always true that the people are foolish, though their opinions are sound; because they do not perceive the truth where it is, and, as they place it where it is not, their opinions are always very false and very unsound.

329

The reason of effects.—­The weakness of man is the reason why so many things are considered fine, as to be good at playing the lute.  It is only an evil because of our weakness.

330

The power of kings is founded on the reason and on the folly of the people, and specially on their folly.  The greatest and most important thing in the world has weakness for its foundation, and this foundation is wonderfully sure; for there is nothing more sure than this, that the people will be weak.  What is based on sound reason is very ill founded, as the estimate of wisdom.

331

We can only think of Plato and Aristotle in grand academic robes.  They were honest men, like others, laughing with their friends, and when they diverted themselves with writing their Laws and the Politics, they did it as an amusement.  That part of their life was the least philosophic and the least serious; the most philosophic was to live simply and quietly.  If they wrote on politics, it was as if laying down rules for a lunatic asylum; and if they presented the appearance of speaking of a great matter, it was because they knew that the madmen, to whom they spoke, thought they were kings and emperors.  They entered into their principles in order to make their madness as little harmful as possible.