Who then will blame Christians for not being able to give a reason for their belief, since they profess a religion for which they cannot give a reason?  They declare, in expounding it to the world, that it is a foolishness, stultitiam;[90] and then you complain that they do not prove it!  If they proved it, they would not keep their word; it is in lacking proofs, that they are not lacking in sense.  “Yes, but although this excuses those who offer it as such, and takes away from them the blame of putting it forward without reason, it does not excuse those who receive it.”  Let us then examine this point, and say, “God is, or He is not.”  But to which side shall we incline?  Reason can decide nothing here.  There is an infinite chaos which separated us.  A game is being played at the extremity of this infinite distance where heads or tails will turn up.  What will you wager?  According to reason, you can do neither the one thing nor the other; according to reason, you can defend neither of the propositions.

Do not then reprove for error those who have made a choice; for you know nothing about it.  “No, but I blame them for having made, not this choice, but a choice; for again both he who chooses heads and he who chooses tails are equally at fault, they are both in the wrong.  The true course is not to wager at all.”

Yes; but you must wager.  It is not optional.  You are embarked.  Which will you choose then?  Let us see.  Since you must choose, let us see which interests you least.  You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and misery.  Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other, since you must of necessity choose.  This is one point settled.  But your happiness?  Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is.  Let us estimate these two chances.  If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing.  Wager, then, without hesitation that He is.—­“That is very fine.  Yes, I must wager; but I may perhaps wager too much.”—­Let us see.  Since there is an equal risk of gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one, you might still wager.  But if there were three lives to gain, you would have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to chance your life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and gain.  But there is an eternity of life and happiness.  And this being so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain.  But there is here an infinity